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LAW, RELIGION, AND IMMIGRATION: BUILDING BRIDGES 




This Article asks whether it can ever be moral or legal to use certain criteria, 
including nationality and/or religion, in formulating preferential immigration 
policies. In order to answer the question, it presents an in-depth look at the 
controversial “right of return,” focusing in particular on the example of the 
Israeli Law of Return. It contains a detailed history of the law and its 
development; a defense of the right of return in general; the principle and 
contextual arguments in favor of an amendment to or abrogation of Israel’s law; 
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INTRODUCTION 
On February 18, 2016, Pope Francis gave an in-flight interview on his way 
from Juarez, Mexico to Rome, Italy.1 The interview went viral2 because when 
asked about Donald Trump’s plan to build a wall between Mexico and the United 
States, the Pontiff responded that, “[a] person who thinks only about building 
walls, wherever they may be, and not building bridges, is not Christian.”3 
The comment ignited a firestorm of media attention as well as a back-and-
forth between the Vatican and Trump’s political camp that focused on context, 
the role of religion in immigration policies, and what the Pope actually meant.4 
While much has been written about the legal and religious implications of 
keeping a particular religious group or nationality out of a given country5—a 
question that was recently revisited when Trump called for a temporary ban on 
all Muslim immigrants6—relatively little has been written about the opposite 
idea: whether, to use the Pope’s analogy, a person can build a bridge that has an 
express lane in for a particular nationality or religion. 
 
 1 Full Text of Pope Francis’ In-Flight Interview from Mexico to Rome, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY 
(Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/full-text-of-pope-francis-in-flight-interview-from-
mexico-to-rome-85821/. 
 2 See, e.g., Molly Hemingway, 5 Problems with Pope Francis’ Comments, FEDERALIST (Feb. 18, 2016), 
http://thefederalist.com/2016/02/18/5-problems-with-pope-francis-comments-on-donald-trumps-faith/; John 
Hayward, Trump Vs. Pope Francis, BREITBART (Feb. 19, 2016), http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/ 
2016/02/19/trump-vs-pope-francis-immigration-compassion-and-national-legitimacy/; Hayley Hoefer, Views 
You Can Use: The Pope Vs. the Donald, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 18, 2016), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/articles/ 
2016-02-18/pope-francis-says-donald-trumps-views-on-immigration-arent-christian. 
 3 Hoefer, supra note 2. 
 4 James Martin, What the Pope Did, and Didn’t, Mean When He Said Trump Was Not a Christian, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/02/19/what-the-pope-did-and-
didnt-mean-when-he-said-trump-was-not-a-christian/. 
 5 See, e.g., James R. Edwards, Jr., A Biblical Perspective on Immigration Policy, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 
10 (Sept. 2009), http://cis.org/sites/cis.org/files/articles/2009/immigration-biblical-perspective.pdf; Matthew 
Soerens, Scripture and Immigration, WELCOMING STRANGER, http://welcomingthestranger.com/wp_ 
welcoming/learn-and-discern/scripture-and-immigration (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); What Does the Bible Say 
About Refugees and Immigrants?, DISCIPLES HOME MISSIONS, 1–3 (2007), http://christianchurchestogether.org/ 
wp-content/uploads/2013/01/What-Does-Bible-Say-Disciples-of-Christ.pdf; Sarah Larimer, Why Franklin 
Graham Says Donald Trump is Right About Stopping Muslim Immigration, WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/acts-of-faith/wp/2015/12/10/why-franklin-graham-says-donald-trump-
is-right-about-stopping-muslim-immigration/; Jazz Shaw, So Is a “Complete and Total Shutdown” of Muslim 
Immigration Legal?, HOT AIR (Dec. 8, 2015), http://hotair.com/archives/2015/12/08/so-is-a-complete-and-total-
shutdown-of-muslim-immigration-legal-constitutional/. 
 6 Jeremy Diamond, Donald Trump: Ban All Muslim Travel to U.S., CNN (Dec. 8, 2015), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/12/07/politics/donald-trump-muslim-ban-immigration/. 
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This Article argues that while it may not be moral or legal to keep a group 
out of a country based on their nationality or religion, it can, at times, be both 
moral and legal to use the same criteria to build an express lane in a country. 
While this idea is one that has implications for countries all over the world, the 
example that we use to make this point is the somewhat controversial, oft-
debated Law of Return in the State of Israel. 
To begin, we move back in time just thirteen months before the Pope and the 
current President had their through-the-media exchange, to a darker moment in 
world history that led people to ask all kinds of questions about immigration, 
law, and religion. 
A. Overview 
To all the Jews of France, all the Jews of Europe, I would like to say 
that Israel is not just the place in whose direction you pray, the state of 
Israel is your home. . . . All Jews who want to immigrate to Israel will 
be welcomed here warmly and with open arms. We will help you in 
your absorption here in our state that is also your state.7 
With those words, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for the 
Jews of Europe to take advantage of Israel’s Law of Return.8 His instruction 
came at the heels of the January 2015 Charlie Hebdo terrorist attack which left 
more than a dozen people killed—including four Jews who were slaughtered not 
for anything they had allegedly done, but simply for what they were.9 
Netanyahu’s words were echoed later in the day by Avigdor Lieberman, the 
Israeli Foreign Minister, and Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon; they both agreed 
that the safest place for the Jews of Europe is Israel.10 On February 15, 2015, 
just over a month later, a gunman in Copenhagen, the capital of Denmark, 
attacked a synagogue where a Bar Mitzvah was being celebrated.11 Speaking 
from his Cabinet meeting in Jerusalem, Netanyahu once again repeated the 
following: 
 
 7 Justin Jalil et al., Netanyahu to French Jews: ‘Israel is Your Home’, TIMES ISR. (Jan. 10, 2015), 
http://www.timesofisrael.com/netanyahu-to-french-jews-israel-is-your-home/. 
 8 See id. 
 9 When Jews Are Killed, No One Asks Why, TOWER (Jan. 1, 2016), http://www.thetower.org/2780-charlie-
hebdo-editor-when-jews-are-killed-no-one-asks-why/. 
 10 Netanyahu to French Jews: ‘Come Home to Israel from Terrible Europeans Anti-Semitism’, RT (Jan. 
12, 2015), http://rt.com/news/221499-israel-pm-immigration-france/. 
 11 Copenhagen Shootings: Denmark Buries Jewish Victim Dan Uzan, TELEGRAPH (Feb. 18, 2015), 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/denmark/11421109/Copenhagen-shootings-Denmark-
buries-Jewish-victim-Dan-Uzan.html. 
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Jews have been murdered again on European soil only because they 
were Jews and this wave of terrorist attacks—including murderous 
anti-Semitic attacks—is expected to continue . . . . Of course, Jews 
deserve protection in every country but we say to Jews, to our brothers 
and sisters: Israel is your home. . . . I would like to tell all European 
Jews and all Jews wherever they are: Israel is the home of every Jew.12 
Over the last couple of years, the rise of anti-Semitic attacks in Europe, and 
the public call for European Jewry to take advantage of Israel’s Law of Return, 
has coincided with the international focus on the legality and morality of letting 
people in, or keeping people out, based on religious and national criteria. The 
time has come for an in-depth look at the oft-criticized Law of Return itself, 
from both a legal and moral standpoint. 
The Law of Return, which was passed by the Knesset in 1950, gives all 
Jewish people an unconditional right to immigrate to Israel and gain 
citizenship.13 For many years, the law has been considered one of the 
foundational stones in the ongoing construction of Israeli law14 and has enjoyed 
wide consensus amongst the citizens of the State.15 In recent years, however, 
voices from inside and outside of Israel have begun questioning its legitimacy 
and wisdom.16 
For simplicity’s sake, critics of the Law of Return can be usefully sorted into 
two main categories. First, there are those who attack the law from a moral 
standpoint, claiming that the law unfairly discriminates against non-Jewish 
citizens of the State as well as immigrant applications from other nationalities.17 
Second, there are those whose claims are focused not on the legitimacy of the 
Law at the time it was passed, but rather on the continued legitimacy and 
usefulness of such a law today.18 Critics point to two major changes that have 
 
 12 Cheryl K. Chumley, Benjamin Netanyahu Tells Europe’s Jews to Move to Israel, ‘Your Home’, WASH. 
TIMES (Feb. 16, 2015), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/feb/16/benjamin-netanyahu-tells-europes-
jews-to-move-to-i/. 
 13 Law of Return 5710–1950, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/mfa-
archive/1950-1959/pages/law%20of%20return%205710-1950.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 14 David Clayman, The Law of Return Reconsidered, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFF. (July 16, 1995), 
http://www.jcpa.org/jl/hit01.htm. 
 15 Id. 
 16 See, e.g., Alex Stein, Is the Law of Return Unjust?, DAILY BEAST (May 10, 2013), http://www. 
thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/05/10/law-of-return.html. 
 17 The Discriminatory Laws Database, ADALAH (May 30, 2012), http://www.adalah.org/en/content/view/ 
7771. 
 18 Mark J. Altschul, Israel’s Law of Return and the Debate of Altering, Repealing, or Maintaining Its 
Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 1345, 1356 (2002). 
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taken place since the founding of the State that, in theory, might obligate Israel 
to revisit its immigration policies. 
First, in contrast to the circumstances around the founding of the State, the 
Jewish people today are no longer openly and systematically persecuted.19 
Second, in the early years, the economic situation and security concerns in the 
State of Israel left the country quite weak;20 however, today, both the economy 
and the security of the nation are strong.21 Accordingly, the nature of those 
seeking to immigrate to Israel has changed. In the first decades, immigration was 
motivated by Zionistic aspirations and a desire to find sanctuary from hate and 
persecution, whereas today, a substantial number of immigrants do so mainly 
out of a desire to improve their quality of life.22 Critics of the Law of Return 
claim that if these assumptions are true, they erode, or even entirely erase, the 
moral basis for the right of those eligible to return.23 If correct, these assumptions 
also make the current arrangement undesirable from the perspective of the State 
of Israel’s interests.24 
This Article will consider these two types of challenges. Ultimately, we 
reject the fundamental arguments against the Law of Return while partially 
accepting the contextual arguments. The following is a brief outline of how the 
rest of the Article will proceed: 
Part I will be dedicated to a historical review. We will describe the 
circumstances that led to the enactment of the original Law of Return and the 
way it has been used over the course of time, including the process that led to 
the one fundamental amendment it has already undergone. 
Part II will be dedicated to the presentation and the rejection of the 
fundamental morals-based arguments. Our claim is that immigration 
arrangements that give preferences based on nationality and/or religion can be, 
and in this case are, consistent with the basic principles of liberalism. Every 
person has a fundamental right to culture, and from this individual right we can 
 
 19 Id. at 1365. 
 20 Id. at 1368; see also REGIONAL AND ETHIC CONFLICTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM THE FRONT LINES 97–98 
(Judy Carter, George Irani, & Vamik D. Volken, eds., 2009). 
 21 Alex Brill, Israel’s Economic Growth Impressive, SUN SENTINEL (Nov. 5, 2015), http://www.sun-
sentinel.com/opinion/commentary/fl-viewpoint-israel-20151105-story.html. 
 22 Hila Zaban, Becoming a Local Within a Bubble: Enclaves of Transnational Jewish Immigrants from 
Western Countries in Jerusalem, 16 J. INT’L MIGRATION & INTEGRATION 1003, 1005–06 (2014). 
 23 See YORAM HAZONY, THE JEWISH STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR ISRAEL’S SOUL 57–58 (2000). 
 24 Id. (referring to the arguments of critics who claim that the law must be repealed as it provides a means 
for many “unwanted immigrants” to enter Israel). 
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derive a nation-state’s right to self-determination. The logic underlying the right 
to self-determination in a nation-state leads to the right of members of a national 
group to migrate to their nation-state, as well as to the right or interest of the 
nation-state to favor group members in their immigration policies. 
In addition to this general justification, we will argue that the Law of Return 
can be based on two unique justifications. One relies on the Jewish people’s right 
to protection and safety from continued hatred and persecution, a right that all 
members of a persecuted people have, and which is especially relevant to the 
members of the Jewish nation.25 A second justification is based on the fact that, 
contrary to other nations, membership in the Jewish nation is not contingent on 
race or blood and that every human being is, in fact, able to join the Jewish 
people through conversion.26 Furthermore, for the purposes of the Law of 
Return, this conversion does not even have to have an overtly “religious” 
orientation. 
In Part III, we address the contextual arguments. As a preliminary issue, we 
point out that accepting all of the proposed limitations on the Right of Return 
will eliminate one of Israel’s founding principles. Israel has always believed that 
the Law of Return does not grant a right to the Jewish people of the world; it 
merely recognizes a right that every Jewish person already possesses, regardless 
of what the State says.27 Obviously, any country is permitted to change its 
founding principles, yet such a decision should not be taken lightly. 
Getting to the heart of the matter, this Article agrees that a significant 
percentage of the people making Aliyah28 today are not connected in any 
significant way to Jewish culture and provides several explanations for this 
phenomenon. We do point out, however, that the overwhelming majority of non-
affiliated immigrants to Israel eventually join the Jewish majority there, 
adopting the culture and assimilating into Jewish-Israeli society.29 In light of this 
reality, we argue that Israel should keep the current arrangement largely intact, 
 
 25 Ayelet Shachar, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. 
L.J. 233, 235 (1999). 
 26 Altschul, supra note 18, at 1353. 
 27 HAZONY, supra note 23, at 56 (citing David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister, Speech (July 3, 1950)) 
(reprinted in Jerusalem Post, July 19, 1957). 
 28 Aliyah has been defined as “the immigration of Jews back to their ancestral homeland.” See Defining 
Aliyah: The Meaning and History of Jewish Return to Zion, INT’L CHRISTIAN EMBASSY JERUSALEM (Mar. 26, 
2017), https://int.icej.org/aid/defining-aliyah. 
 29 Alexander Yakobson, Joining the Jewish People: Non-Jewish Immigrants from the Former USSR, 
Israeli Identity and Jewish Peoplehood, 43 ISR. L. REV. 218, 226–27 (2010). 
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since a high absorption rate serves the Israeli interest. However, we do note that 
some immigrants who are given rights under the Law of Return are active 
members of other faiths, and these immigrants tend not to become absorbed into 
the Jewish majority.30 Therefore, we ultimately conclude that it is advisable to 
amend the Law of Return to address this particular phenomenon. 
The argument regarding the disappearance of anti-Semitism (or at least its 
weakening) is regrettably rejected. We point out that while the reasoning behind 
anti-Semitism does periodically change, anti-Semitism as a phenomenon 
unfortunately continues to thrive even in countries where Jewish existence was 
nearly extinguished after the Holocaust, as well as in countries like the United 
States, where Jewish people enjoy a general sense of safety and prosperity.31 It 
is further argued that the high rate and prevalence of anti-Semitism requires 
Israel to respect every Jewish person’s right to immigrate to Israel, based on the 
right to be free from persecution, without a need to prove actual persecution in 
every instance. 
I. HISTORY OF THE LAW 
A. The Law of Return (1950) 
At the end of the British Mandate in Palestine, as the last of the British troops 
departed, the members of the National Council of the Jewish Community 
gathered and declared the establishment of the modern State of Israel.32 The 
Israeli Declaration of Independence stated that “the State of Israel will be open 
to all Jews.”33 This announcement was greatly needed in light of the severe 
restrictions placed by the British authorities on Jewish immigration.34 These 
restrictions had not been lifted even in moments of severe crisis and need, like 
 
 30 See Asher Greenberg, Israel, Designed to Absorb Jewish Refugees, Now Struggles with African Migrant 
Wave, TABLET (Mar. 26, 2017), http://www.tabletmag.com/jewish-news-and-politics/158935/migrants-in-
south-tel-aviv. See generally Minority Communities in Israel: Background & Overview, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR. 
(Feb. 16, 2016), http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/minority-communities-in-israel-2. 
 31 See The 2013 Top Ten Anti-Israel Groups in the U.S., ADL (2013), http://www.adl.org/assets/pdf/israel-
international/israel—middle-east/Top-Ten-2013-Report.pdf; see also Susan Jones, FBI: Jews Twice as Likely as 
Muslims to be Targeted by Hate Crimes, CNSNEWS (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/ 
susan-jones/fbi-jews-twice-likely-muslims-be-targeted-religious-hate-crimes-us. 
 32 WILLIAM L. CLEVELAND, A HISTORY OF THE MODERN MIDDLE EAST 252 (6th ed., 2016). 
 33 The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, Official Gazette, No. 1 of the 5th Iyar, 5708, 
May 14, 1948, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide+to+the+Peace+Process/Declaration+of+ 
Establishment+of+State+of+Israel.htm [hereinafter The Declaration]. 
 34 Immigration to Israel: British Restrictions on Jewish Immigration to Palestine, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/mandate.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
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during World War II, when European Jews were systematically exterminated by 
the Nazis, or after the War when hundreds of thousands of Jewish refugees were 
trying to enter the country in search of a safe haven.35 Thus, in its very first 
meeting, on the day after the State was established—even before the 
Representatives signed the Independence Scroll36—the Provisional Council 
officially abolished the limits set by the mandate on Jewish immigration.37 In 
doing so, they provided a ray of hope and assurance to post-Holocaust Jews 
around the globe, essentially saying that they all had a home to come back to.38 
While the gates of Israel were immediately and effectively opened to Jewish 
immigration upon the establishment of the State, the Law of Return, which 
legally enshrines the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel, was not passed 
by the Knesset until July 5, 1950, over two years later.39 The main reason for the 
time lag was the legislature’s original intention to encapsulate this right in a 
constitution, which was supposed to be adopted shortly after the State was 
established.40 The initiative to form a constitution, however, faced many 
stumbling blocks along the way. Among these difficulties were the failure to 
bridge some deep moral disagreements; the reluctance of the ruling party, 
Mapai, led by David Ben-Gurion, to adopt a constitution that would limit the 
government’s power;41 and possibly the transformation of the Constitutive 
Assembly (elected for the sole purpose of establishing a constitution) into the 
first Knesset, which weakened the interest of that body to establish a 
constitution.42 The public debate over the constitution and its contents, which 
lasted nearly two years, made it clear to everyone that the establishment of a 
 
 35 The policy, which was published in the 1939 “White Paper,” established severe limits on the continued 
immigration of Jews to the country. See Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019 (May 23, 1939), 
http://unispal.un.org/UNISPAL.NSF/0/EB5B88C94ABA2AE585256D0B00555536.  
 36 The Independence Scroll was the document that established the State of Israel. Establishment of Israel: 
The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www. 
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-declaration-of-the-establishment-of-the-state-of-israel. 
 37 The Declaration, supra note 33. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. 
 40 See Mark Goldfeder, The State of Israel’s Constitution; A Comparison of Civilized Nations, 25 PACE 
INT’L L. REV. 65 (2013). 
 41 See Ruth Gavison, A Constitution for Israel: Lessons from the American Experiment, 12 AZURE 133, 
146 (2002). See generally Ruth Gavison, The Controversy Over Israel’s Bill of Rights, 15 ISR. Y.B. ON HUMAN 
RIGHTS. 113 (1985). 
 42 See generally Gideon Sapir, Constitutional Revolutions: Israel as a Case Study, 5 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 
359 (2010). 
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constitution was not yet possible.43 As a result, the Knesset turned to enshrining 
the right of Jews to immigrate to Israel in a “regular” legislative act.44 
The Law of Return was passed by the Knesset on July 5, 1950.45 The Knesset 
member who introduced the bill stressed the importance of the date when the 
law was passed since it was the anniversary of the death of Theodor Herzl, who 
was considered the visionary of the Jewish State. Section 3 of the Law 
established the right of every Jew to immigrate to Israel. This right had minimal 
restrictions and was denied only to those who “act against the Jewish People, or 
may endanger public health or national security.”46 Four years later, another 
section of the Law was added that denies the right to immigrate to someone with 
“a criminal past, likely to endanger the public.”47 Over the years, the use of these 
exceptions to limit the immigration of Jews to Israel has been minimal.48 
B. The 1970 Amendment 
Since its implementation, very few significant changes have been made to 
the Law of Return. One notable exception occurred in 1970 following the 
political crisis that arose from a controversial ruling by the Supreme Court of 
Israel. We will briefly describe the Amendment and the circumstances 
surrounding its adoption. 
In the period before the founding of the State and in the early years of its 
existence, no attempts were made to officially define the term “Jew”; anyone 
who claimed to be Jewish was simply treated as such.49 In the beginning, the 
 
 43 See id. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. The Knesset member who introduced the bill stressed the 
importance of the date when the law was passed since it was the anniversary of the death of Theodor Herzl, who 
was considered the visionary of the Jewish State. See Law of Return is Enacted, CTR. FOR ISR. EDUC., 
https://israeled.org/law-of-return-enacted/. This was the Hebrew date of his passing, 20 of Tamuz. Theodor 
(Binyamin Ze’ec) Herzl, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/biography/Herzl. 
html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).  
 46 Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. 
 47 1st Amendment, 5714-1954, SH No. 163 p. 174 (Isr.). 
 48 See, e.g., HCJ 9056/11 Marmelstien v. Minister of Interior, (Nevo Legal Database, 18.6.2013) (Isr.) 
(original in Hebrew). In this case, the Court upheld the Minister of Interior’s decision to deny the Right of Return 
to the Ukrainian husband of a Jewish Woman, who was convicted of attempted murder fifteen years before his 
request. Id. 
 49 RUTH GAVISON, THE LAW OF RETURN AT SIXTY YEARS: HISTORY, IDEOLOGY, JUSTIFICATION 45–46 
(2009) (original in Hebrew). See ALEXANDER YAKOBSON & AMNON RUBINSTEIN, ISRAEL AND THE FAMILY OF 
NATIONS: THE JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 140 (2009). 
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Law of Return also left this definition open, leaving room for a broad spectrum 
of possible religious, social, and cultural interpretations. 
The choice to leave the definition open was no accident—it was an attempt 
to avoid the deeply religious and political question of who should be included.50 
The question, however, could not be avoided forever; evading the question only 
shifted the heavy burden from the legislative branch (who failed to define it) to 
the executive branch (who struggled to implement an ill-defined law) and, 
finally, to the Court, who had to review those executive decisions.51 The Court 
addressed the controversy in several high profile cases,52 including the Shalit 
case,53 which led to its amendment.54 The Shalit case was notable not only for 
the hard substantive question it dealt with but also for the political and legislative 
responses it evoked.55 
Benjamin Shalit was a Jewish officer in the Israeli Navy who married a non-
Jewish woman, Anne, while he was studying abroad.56 When Anne moved to 
Israel in 1960, she received a resident certificate, and in the registration 
documents she was listed as having no religious affiliation.57 The couple had 
two children. When Shalit went to fill out their registration, he listed them as 
having no affiliation under religion, but as Jewish under the rubric for national 
affiliation, despite traditional Judaism being matriarchal. When the registration 
clerk refused to let this through, Shalit petitioned the Supreme Court of Israel. 
He claimed that a person should be able to belong to the Jewish nation without 
being a member of the Jewish religion. 
 
 50 See generally Gideon Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature 
Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 
1233 (2006). Some scholars claim that the lack of definition was not based on a desire to avoid controversy, but 
on the mistaken assumption that there was no controversy, and that everyone agreed. See Moshe Silberg, 
Personal Status in Israel 349 (1965) [Hebrew]. See also Comments of the Minister of Justice, Shapira, in the 
Knesset deliberation prior to the Amendment of the Law of Return in 1970. 5 Major Knesset Debates 1948–81, 
1697 (Netanel Lorch, ed. 1993). 
 51 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 61–69 (describing the dispute and the Court’s role in resolving it). See 
generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The 
Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50. 
 52 See Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. 
 53 HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior 23(2) PD (II) 477 (1970), translated at Selected Judgments 
of The Supreme Court of Israel, Special Volume, 35 (1971) [hereinafter Shalit].  
 54 Rebecca Weiner, Judaism: Who Is A Jew?, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBR., https://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. 
org/jsource/Judaism/whojew1.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 55 Religion: Who Is a Jew? TIME (Feb. 2, 1970); Weiner, supra note 54.  
 56 See Lawrence S. Nesis, Who is a Jew, 4 MANITOBA L. J. 53 (1970). 
 57 Id. 
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Reflecting the tremendous importance of the case, an unprecedented panel 
of nine justices sat to hear it.58 Before it issued an opinion, the Court asked the 
Government to delete the national affiliation category entirely, which would 
have mooted the question once again. The Government, however, refused, and 
by a narrow majority of five against four, the Court granted the petition, 
instructing that the children be registered as belonging to the Jewish nation.59 
The decision surprised many in the traditional religious community, and amidst 
the public and political upheaval, the National Religious Party threatened to 
leave the coalition, which would have caused the Government to crumble.60 In 
an effort to alleviate tension, the Law of Return was amended to include the 
definition of a Jew; the new section defined a Jew as a person born to a Jewish 
mother or who had converted and did not belong to another religion.61 
This marked the first time that a definition for the term “Jew” was codified 
in law, and the definition provoked much criticism.62 The Amendment 
significantly narrowed the eligibility to immigrate and left outside of its 
parameters many people who felt strongly connected to the Jewish people.63 In 
an attempt to accommodate such individuals, the Knesset introduced another 
amendment to the Law of Return, which greatly expanded the Right of Return 
by granting this right to any family member of an entitled person (i.e., a “Jew” 
by the above-mentioned definition), up to a third generation regardless of the 
family member’s religious affiliation.64 Section 4A of the 1970 Amendment 
vests the right to immigrate to Israel in the following individuals: “a child and a 
grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a Jew, the spouse of a child and a grandchild 
 
 58 Currently, fifteen justices serve on the Supreme Court of Israel. Id. at 56. Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court, 
where the entire bench presides over all cases, the Supreme Court of Israel usually sits as a bench of three. The 
Judiciary: The Court System, ISR. MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFF., http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/aboutisrael/state/ 
democracy/pages/the%20judiciary-%20the%20court%20system.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). However, 
there is a possibility of expanding the panel. Id. 
 59 For a discussion of the judgment and the related circumstances, see id.; PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN 
JERUSALEM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 196–200 (1997); Altschul, supra note 
18, at 1345–65; Noah Baer, Who is a Jew? A Determination of Ethnic Status for Purposes of the Israeli 
Population Registry, 10 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 133 (1971). 
 60 Nesis, supra note 56, at 80; see also N.R.P. Walkout Threat, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 25, 1970, at 1 
(discussing the N.R.P’s threats to quit the coalition in the event of the registration not being amended by way of 
legislation). 
 61 Id. Following the Amendment of the Law of Return, the Court rejected an additional petition filed by 
Shalit in which he requested to have his third child, who was born after the decision in the first petition, registered 
as a Jew. See HCJ 18/72 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior, 23(1) PD (1) 334 (1972) (Isr.).  
 62 Shachar, supra note 25, at 245. 
 63 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 67.  
 64 Knesset Amends Law of Return to Define “Who is a Jew,” CTR. FOR ISRAEL EDUCATION (Mar. 10, 2017), 
https://israeled.org/knesset-amends-law-of-return/.  
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of a Jew.”65 This Amendment rejected the Shalit case approach, in which the 
Court had treated the determination of Jewishness according to religion as 
distinct from the determination of membership in the Jewish nation; but, at the 
same time, it extended eligibility to numerous non-Jews who could now make 
the Aliyah.66 
While the 1970 Amendment provided a definition of “Jew” in the context of 
the Law of Return, the Knesset failed to determine the nature of the conversion 
process that was necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of the Law. 
Hence, from this point onwards, the question was no longer “who is a Jew?” but, 
rather, “who is a Jewish convert?” For a long period of time, the Orthodox mode 
of conversion enjoyed a monopolistic status in the context of the Law of 
Return.67 However, in 2005, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled that the State 
should confer equal recognition to all conversions conducted abroad by a 
recognized stream of Judaism (Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform).68 As we 
shall explain later, this shift can be thought of as a crucially important fact in 
discussing allegedly discriminatory immigration policies. 
II. THE PRINCIPLED ARGUMENT 
A. The Argument 
In recent years, many voices have arisen that challenge the legitimacy of the 
Law of Return. The argument is that the Law, on its face, discriminates against 
non-Jewish citizens of Israel69 as well as people of other nationalities that wish 
to immigrate.70 Before we begin, we should note that the Law of Return is not 
the only option for those that are interested in immigrating to Israel. Aside from 
this special provision, there is the general immigration law, which allows for 
 
 65 Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5710–1950, SH No. 586 p. 34 (Isr.). 
 66 Id. at 67. 
 67 See Altschul, supra note 18, at 1353.  
 68 HCJ 2597/99 Toshbeim v. Minister of the Interior, 59(6) PD 721 (2005) (Isr.); see Sapir, How Should a 
Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is 
a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50, at 1247–50. 
 69 See, e.g., CHAIM GANS, THE LIMITS OF NATIONALISM 141 (2003) (“There is no doubt that the principal 
injustice that the Law of Return causes . . . stem[s] from the fact that it grants such advantages to one nation 
within a state which includes members of more than one nation entitled to self-determination.”). 
 70 See, e.g., Shachar, supra note 25, at 236–37 (“[U]nlike most other countries, while Israel regulates the 
flow of immigrants to its territory, it also permits an unrestricted entitlement to membership for a particular 
group of persons . . . . The problem with this otherwise embracing immigration policy is that it does not embrace 
all potential immigrants.”). 
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immigration under certain fairly standard conditions, with especially generous 
access if the individual seeking immigration has familial ties to an Israeli 
citizen.71 Critics, however, believe that the law unjustifiably places non-Jewish 
Israeli citizens and persons of other nationalities in an inferior position by 
bestowing an automatic immigration right to Jewish people.72 
The State of Israel is not the only country with immigration procedures that 
give priority to a particular nation; indeed, many countries have legislation 
premised on a “Right of Return.”73 Thus, this criticism is not leveled against the 
Israeli Law of Return alone, but, rather, targets any similar immigration 
legislation.74 The pertinent question is, therefore, whether any nation’s use of 
national affiliation to distinguish between immigration applicants violates the 
duty to act with equality.75 This question will be answered herein. 
B. Discussion 
1. Insufficient Answers 
The Declaration defines Israel as a “Jewish state.”76 The Supreme Court of 
Israel has repeatedly ruled that the Jewishness of the State is a “constitutional 
basic fact” underlying the activity of state authorities.77 Israeli law internalized 
 
 71 The Citizenship Nationality Law provides three ways by which to acquire Israeli citizenship: residence, 
birth, and naturalization. Citizenship Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951–52) (Isr.). 
 72  See Raef Zreik, Notes on the Value of Theory: Readings in the Law of Return—A Polemic, 2 L. & 
ETHICS HUM. RTS. 34313 (2008). 
 73 See, e.g., Ústavní zákon č. No. 23/1991 Sb., Listina Základních Práv a Svobod [Charter of Fundamental 
Rights and Freedoms] art. 14, para. 4 (“Every citizen is free to enter the territory of the Czech and Slovak Federal 
Republic. No citizen may be forced to leave her homeland.”) (This Charter was enacted by the Czechoslovak 
Federative Republic and preserved in the constitutional systems of the Czech Republic and Slovak Republic.); 
MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY art. XIV, para. 1 
(“Hungarian citizens shall not be expelled from the territory of Hungary and may return from abroad at any time. 
Foreigners staying in the territory of Hungary may only be expelled under a lawful decision. Collective expulsion 
shall be prohibited.”).  
 74 See, e.g., Jeff Spinner-Halev, Unoriginal Sin: Zionism and Democratic Exclusion in Comparative 
Perspective, 18 ISR. STUD. F. 26, 33 (2002); Alexander Yakobson, Jewish Peoplehood and the Jewish State—
How Unique?, 13 ISR. STUD. 1, 1–27 3, 5 (2008); see also Ruth Gavison & Nahson Perez, Days of Rest in 
Multicultural Societies: Public, Private, Separate?, in LAW & RELIGION IN THEORETICAL & HISTORICAL 
CONTEXT 186, 206–07 (Peter Cane et al. eds., 2008). 
 75 See generally Li Weiwei, Equality and Non-Discrimination Under International Human Rights Law, 
NORWEGIAN CTR. FOR HUM. RTS. (2004). 
 76 The Declaration, supra note 33. The Declaration also affirms that the State and its laws would “be based 
on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel.” Id. 
 77 EA 1/65 Yardor v. Chairman of the Central Election Committee for the Sixth Knesset, 19(3) Isr. SC 365, 
385 (1965).  
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this basic element in its constitutional documents,78 as well as in political and 
social areas. For example, Israeli election legislation disqualifies a candidate list 
that negates the Jewish character of the State.79 The State of Israel enshrines in 
legislation the status of the institutions of the Jewish people.80 It uses the Jewish 
culture in the State’s symbols and official ceremonies and establishes the 
Sabbath and Jewish holidays as the official days of rest.81 It gives the spirit of 
Jewish law a certain status in the ruling of the courts.82 Israeli law also preserves 
in legislation the remembrance of the Holocaust,83 compensates Holocaust 
victims,84 and judges Nazis for their crimes.85 It applies the Penal Law of the 
State of Israel towards offenses against Jews as Jews, even if committed outside 
its territory and towards non-citizens.86 In fact, the Declaration itself references 
the concept of Return as a major founding principle of the State.87 
The identification of Israel as a nation-state, and the anchoring of its national 
character in its established immigration practices, are not unique to Israel. As 
Rubenstein and Yakobson point out, many countries—especially in Europe—
are categorized as nation-states.88 One of the most significant and common 
identifiers of nation-states is the preference of certain nationals in the 
 
 78 Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 p. 150 (1992); Basic Law: Freedom 
of Occupation, 5754-1994, SH No. 1454 p. 90 (1994). 
 79 Basic Law: The Knesset, as amended at 5745-1985, SH No. 1155 p. 196 (1958) (Isr.) (A list of candidates 
will not participate in elections to the Knesset if its aims or actions, expressly or by implication, deny the 
existence of the State of Israel as the state of the Jewish people.). 
 80 See, e.g., World Zionist Organizations and Jewish Agency for Israel Status Law, 5713-1952, 7 LSI 3 
(1952); Jewish National FundKeren Kayemet LeYisrael Law, 5714-1953, 8 LSI 35 (1958). 
 81 The State of Israel as a Jewish State, KNESSET, http://knesset.gov.il/constitution/ConstMJewishState. 
htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 82 Law of Legal Foundations of Law, 5740-1980, § 1, 34 LSI 181 (1980). 
 83 Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Commemoration (Yad Vashem) Law, 5713-1953, SH No. 132 p. 144 (1953); 
Martyrs’ and Heroes’ Remembrance Day Law, 5719-1959, SH No. 280 p. 112 (1959); Denial of Holocaust 
(Prohibition) Law, 5746-1986, SH No. 1187 p. 196 (1986); State Education Law (Amendment No. 5), 5760-
2000, SH 122 (2000) sec 2(4). 
 84 Invalids (Nazi Persecution) Law, 5717-1957, SH No. 43 p. 111 (1957) (Isr.); Claims by Victims of the 
Nazis or Their Satellites (Regulation of Handling) Law, 5717-1957 (Isr.); Victims of Holocaust Property Law 
(Restoration to Successors and Dedication to Support and Perpetuation), 5765-2005 (Isr.). 
 85 Nazis and Nazi Collaborators (Punishment Law), 5750-1950, SH No. 57 p. 281 (1950); CC 40/61 
Attorney General v. Eichmann 45 PM 45 3 (1961) (Isr.); CrimA 336/61 Eichmann v. Attorney General 16 SC 
2033 (1962) (Isr.); CrimA 347/88 Demjanjuk v. State of Israel 47(4) SC 221 (1988) (Isr.). 
 86 Penal Law (Amendment No. 39), 5737-1977, SH No. 1481 p. 348 (1977). 
 87 DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL MAY 14, 1948 (“The State of Israel 
would be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles.”). This is seen as a reference to the 
Biblical promise of the Ingathering of the Exiles in Deuteronomy 30:1-5. 
 88 See generally YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49. 
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immigration policy.89 Of course, it is true that the argument that “everyone does 
it” cannot substitute the need for an independently normative justification for 
the nation-state model, with its various characteristics, including a preferential 
national immigration policy. Similar things can be said with respect to the 
argument that the right to self-determination, including the right to determine 
nationality-based immigration policy, is recognized by international law;90 this 
is certainly a relevant datum, but it cannot substitute the need for an 
independently normative justification for the nation-state model and the 
preference of members of one particular nation in the immigration laws.91 Even 
if international law justifies nation-states and the practice of preferring members 
of one nation in the immigration policy, we need to ask ourselves if this is a 
moral behavior. We will examine this question in the next section but, for now, 
we simply note that many scholars throughout the last century have taken up this 
question with similar conclusions. Henry Sidgwick notes that states can restrict 
immigration to protect “the internal cohesion of a nation,”92 while James Hudson 
and David Miller list protecting the ethnic and cultural makeup of the society as 
one of the justifications for restricting immigration.93 As a recent article noted, 
“whether one finds the justification in a liberal theory94 or a communitarian 
theory,95 the literature on the justifications to restrict immigration is vast and 
well-established.”96 
Another possible answer to the question of prima facie discrimination 
proposes to distinguish between discrimination within the community (i.e. 
amongst community members) and discrimination in relation to non-members 
 
 89 See Christian Joppke, Comparative Citizenship: A Restrictive Turn in Europe?, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. 
RTS. 128 (2008) (providing a useful review of immigration policies in the Western world).  
 90 G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, art. 1 (Dec. 21, 1965). 
 91 See generally AVIAD BAKSHI & GIDEON SAPIR, A Jewish Nation-State: A Discussion in Light of the 
Family Reunification Case, in ISRAELI CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MAKING 487 (Gideon Sapir, Daphne 
Barak-Erez & Aharon Barak eds., Hart Publishing, 2013). 
 92 See HENRY SIDGWICK, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 309 (4th ed. 1919). 
 93 See James L. Hudson, The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, 10 SOC. THEORY & PRAC. 201, 212 (1984); 
David Miller, Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193, 199 
(Andrew Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds., 2005). 
 94 See generally WILL KYMLICKA, LIBERALISM, COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989); Joseph H. Carens, 
Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, 49 REV. POL. 251 (1987); Stephen Macedo, When and Why 
Should Liberal Democracies Restrict Immigration?, in CITIZENSHIP, BORDERS, AND HUMAN NEEDS (Rogers M. 
Smith ed., 2010); Avishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal, Liberalism and the Right to Culture, 661 SOC. RES. 491 
(1994). 
 95 See Miller, supra note 93, at 204.  
 96 Liav Orgad & Theodore Ruthizer, Race, Religion and Nationality in Immigration Selection 120 Years 
After the Chinese Exclusion Case, 26 CONST. COMMENTARY 237, 296 (2010). 
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within the claim itself.97 The argument is simply that the principles of justice 
apply within a particular community but are not binding in the same way 
regarding community members’ attitudes towards non-members.98 If this 
argument is true, it at least refutes the claim that the Law of Return 
“discriminates” against immigration applicants from other nationalities. 
This possible distinction is accepted by a number of writers from the liberal 
camp.99 In our view, however, this type of argument is not convincing, if only 
because it is anachronistic. The assumption underlying the position that the 
application of the principles of justice is confined to the political unit is probably 
the applicability of principles of justice derived from a type of social contract. 
Given the reality of life in the 21st century, where legal and physical boundaries 
between countries are blurred and many parts of the world are working in 
coordination and cooperation, one can certainly argue that the social contract 
crosses political boundaries. Indeed, international law increasingly develops 
tools for international intervention in matters that were considered internal not 
long ago.100 
A milder version of the distinction between the interior and the exterior 
suggests that the degree of commitment of one person to another derives from 
his or her level of proximity. According to this version, the duty of a man 
towards his family is stronger than his obligation to the community in which he 
lives; the second duty is greater than the obligation to the citizens of his state, 
which, in turn, is greater than his duty towards the rest of humanity.101 
Interestingly, this is a traditionally Jewish position, at least in regard to the 
provision of charity and social services.102 We tend to accept this version, but, 
in our opinion, this alone cannot justify a blatant preference of one nationality 
over other nationalities in immigration policy. As noted above, the inter-
relationship between states around the globe today has been significantly 
 
 97 See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983). 
But see Carens, supra note 94, at 251–73. 
 98 See generally GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND 
FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996) (Aliens outside the sovereign territory have usually been considered outside the 
protections of the Constitution. They may have claims under international or statutory law, but the Constitution 
does not generally apply extraterritorially to noncitizens and, therefore, does not provide substantive 
constitutional protection to aliens outside the sovereign territory.). 
 99 See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 97. But see Carens, supra note 94, at 251–73. 
 100 See Daphne Barak-Erez, The International Law of Human Rights and Constitutional Law: A Case Study 
of an Expanding Dialogue, 2 INT’L. J. CONST. L. 611, 612 (2004).  
 101 See, e.g., Ze’ev Maghen, Imagine: On Love and Lennon, 7 AZURE 119, 155 (1999). 
 102 See Babylonian Talmud: Baba Mezi’a 71. 
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strengthened. If commitment is the result of a factual connection, strengthening 
the connection should strengthen the commitment. Accordingly, we believe that 
the attempt to reject the claim of discrimination against non-Jewish immigration 
applicants on the grounds that Israel has no pre-existing obligation towards them 
remains somewhat less than fully convincing. 
Even if we were to accept the distinction between the internal and the 
external, it would only help in dealing with the problem of discrimination 
towards immigration applicants; it would not address the alleged discrimination 
against Israeli citizens who do not belong to the Jewish nation. At first glance, 
one could argue that an immigration policy favoring the dominant nationality 
has no bearing on the status of citizens who do not belong to this nation. This 
was apparently the position taken by the Supreme Court of Israel when it 
determined that “a special key to enter the house was given to the Jewish people 
(see the Law of Return), but when a person is inside as a lawful citizen, he 
enjoyed equal rights with all other household members.”103 However, we tend 
to agree with Chaim Gans, who believes that “preferences in immigration are 
not only external preferences of potential immigrants from one type over another 
type of potential immigrants. They also reflect internal preferences, the 
preferences of one group of citizens in the host country over other citizen groups 
belonging to it.”104 Thus, even if the Law of Return does not infringe upon the 
rights of non-Jewish immigration applicants, it certainly touches upon the lives 
of Israeli citizens who belong to the minority of Arab-Palestinians,105 if only by 
sending a message about societal order and hierarchy. 
Therefore, it is our opinion that the Law of Return cannot be fully justified 
by the claim that “everyone does it,” by the argument that Israel has no 
obligation towards people of other nationalities who wish to immigrate, or by 
the assumption that the Law of Return does not compromise the right to equal 
treatment of minorities living in Israel. The justification for the Law of Return 
has to be found elsewhere if it is to be convincing. 
 
 103 HCJ 6698/95 Kaadan v. Israel Lands Administration 54(1) PD 258 (2000) (Isr.). 
 104 CHAIM GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF RETURN 202 (2006); see also Gideon Sapir, 
Book Review - Yakobson & Rubinstein: Israel and the Family of Nations, 11 DEMOCRATIC CULTURE 295, 319–
23 (2009). 
 105 Shachar, supra note 25, at 263. 
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2. Preferential Immigration Policy and the Right to Self-Determination 
a. The Right to Culture and Its Justifications 
In recent decades, many liberal thinkers have begun to suggest justifications 
for the right to culture. The various proposals can be usefully divided into four 
main formulations, which we will briefly review.106 
[Will] Kymlicka holds that life within the framework of a certain 
culture serves as an imperative condition for affecting the right to 
autonomy. [Charles] Taylor feels that a person’s right to preserve his 
specific culture derives from the right to dignity. In his opinion, a 
person’s human need to be respected by his environment deserves 
recognition. In this framework the uniqueness of each person, which is 
expressed through his culture, must be honored. [Moshe] Halbertal and 
[Avishai] Margalit are convinced that a person’s culture constitutes a 
fundamental component in his self-identity, and therefore the right to 
culture is a derivative of the right to identity. Finally, [Chaim] Gans 
feels that each person has the right to act for the realization of 
significant dreams and considers a person’s cultural choices as the 
effectuation of such a dream.107  
All of the formulations described conclude that the right of human beings to 
live within the framework of their culture should be recognized. 
b. Does the Right to Culture Entail a Right to a Nation-State? 
If there is a right to culture, does it lead to a right to self-determination in a 
nation-state? There are two arguments that likely lead to a negative conclusion: 
First, it can be claimed that it is possible to realise the right to culture 
to a sufficient degree in sub-state community frameworks, and if so, 
there is no justification to demand a nation-state. Second, effectuating 
the right to culture of a national group within the framework of a 
nation-state might entail infringing on the right of cultural minorities 
in that state, including those minorities’ right to culture, so its 
realization should be limited only to sub-state frameworks.108  
 
 106 BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 487. 
 107 Id. at 489. 
 108 Id. at 489–90. 
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This is to say that even if a majority’s right to culture cannot be fully realized 
in a sub-state framework, the benefits of full as opposed to partial realization are 
not offset by the costs to minorities’ rights.  
As a result, many “liberal thinkers who support the right to culture feel it 
should be realized only as part of a multicultural state, and not a nation-state.”109 
Other liberal writers, though, believe that realization of the right to culture might 
require recognizing the right to a nation-state.110 
Finally, it can be argued that providing a nation-state to certain cultural 
groups would in some way discriminate against other cultural groups in the 
world that do not receive the right to self-determination in their nation-state. This 
lack of equality obliges us, so the argument goes, to relinquish the idea of a 
nation-state also on the part of the cultures that do indeed benefit, or might 
benefit, from realization of the right.111 
c. The Right to Culture Does Entail a Right to a Nation-State 
While these arguments carry some weight, at the end of the day, we believe 
that they fail for three reasons: (i) a nation-state is necessary for sufficient 
realization of the right to culture; (ii) the harm to members of minority groups is 
minimal, and many are willing to accept it; and (iii) in this fulfillment, no harm 
is done to global justice. 
i. A Nation-State is Necessary for Realization of the Right to Culture 
While it is true that cultural rights can be realized to a certain degree in a 
multicultural system, the status of a nation-state grants protection to the national 
culture to an extent and power that cannot be compared to the protection given 
by a multicultural state.112 For example, a nation-state can assign resources and 
operate in the international arena to foster the majority’s culture among its 
members and protect cultural-national dispersion. In contrast, it is doubtful 
whether a multicultural state can shoulder the task of assisting the dispersion of 
each sub-member cultural group. In addition, the nation-state, by its very 
 
 109 Id. at 490. 
 110 Id. 
 111 See id at 487–502. 
 112 Lubna S. El-Gendi, Illusory Borders: The Myth of the Modern Nation-State and Its Impact on the 
Repatriation of Cultural Artifacts, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. 485, 505–06 (2016). See generally Liav 
Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism Cultural Restrictions on Migration and Access to Citizenship in Europe, 58 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 53 (2010). 
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existence, constitutes a focal point that consolidates the consciousness of the 
members of the national culture around it.113 The Israeli instance, and its 
relationship with the Jewish diaspora communities, serves as an excellent 
example of this last point. 
In our opinion, the protection provided by a nation-state has become 
especially important in the modern era, marked by its accelerated secularization, 
emphasis on individualism and freedom, and the release of familial and 
communal bonds. In this reality, members of cultural groups can no longer lean 
only on the power of old communal frameworks and need a stronger tool, 
especially one that is institutionalized, to preserve their group culture. In an age 
where the framework of groups and communities has difficulty standing firm, 
state protection of national culture, within the framework of a nation-state, 
becomes especially vital. 
ii. The Harm to Members of Minority Groups Is Minimal and Many Are 
Willing to Accept It 
Even if we were able to show that the model of the nation-state is necessary 
to achieve the right to culture, it would still be necessary to show that one can 
keep safe the rights of cultural minorities living in that state, including their right 
to culture. 
We believe that the protection of the rights of minorities is quite possible, 
even in a nation-state. In this context, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
protection of individual rights of members of minority groups and the protection 
of their collective minority culture. As for individual rights, certain practices 
within the framework of a nation-state may create a strain on various rights of 
minority group members. However, the inevitable tension between rights is a 
recognized reality in the discourse on constitutional rights and is nothing but the 
result that collisions between values are an integral and irrevocable element of 
human life. As we know, constitutional law develops different balancing 
mechanisms in cases of conflict between values.114 As in our case, and in other 
constitutional dilemmas, a balance should be struck between the right to self-
 
 113 See, e.g., DIASPORA AND MULTICULTURALISM: COMMON TRADITIONS AND NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
(Monika Fludernik ed., 2003). 
 114 In recent years, proportionality has become the most widespread balancing formula. See, e.g., AHARON 
BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS (Doron Kalir trans., Cambridge 
University Press 2012); MOSHE COHEN-ELIYA & IDDO PORAT, PROPORTIONALITY AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
CULTURE (Cambridge University Press 2013). 
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determination of the majority group members and the rights of members of 
minority groups that are in question. At the end of the day, certain practices will 
be disqualified115 or limited, while others are approved. 
As noted, the nation-state will be required to respect not only the individual 
rights of members of minority groups but also their cultural rights. Within this 
framework, there will be space to examine the option of granting autonomy, 
partial or complete, to the minority group members on various matters relating 
to the preservation of their culture. There is no reason to assume that this is not 
possible.116 The cultural rights of minority groups will be maintained at the 
community level, while the cultural rights of the majority will be maintained at 
the state level; by definition, this means that the culture of the minorities will not 
enjoy equal status of the national culture.117 But this fact should not, in our 
opinion, outweigh the benefits of the nation-state model. Optimal realization of 
the right to culture of majority groups in the various nation-states is preferable, 
in our opinion, even in the face of the partial inequality caused to minorities who 
enjoy the right to community (and not state) culture. Furthermore, from the point 
of view of minority groups within nation-states, there is, of course, the 
possibility that elsewhere in the world their culture does have a nation-state as 
well. In such a case, one could easily argue that the value of the existence of 
another state where their culture is a state culture is larger than the damage 
involved in defining their country of citizenship as a nation-state of another 
nation. 
iii. No Harm is Done to Global Justice 
Some, like Chaim Gans, have argued that, since there are various cultural 
groups in today’s world that do not have self-determination in their own states, 
there should be a waiver of the nation-state concept by those who do enjoy this 
 
 115 For example, a few years ago, the Supreme Court of Israel struck down an established policy according 
to which Arab-Israeli citizens were not able to join Jewish town communities. HCJ 6698/95 Kaadan v. Israel 
Lands Administration 54(1) PD 258 (2000) (Isr.). The Court ruled that their right to equality overrides the 
community’s interest in preserving its Jewish character. See Id.  
 116 For instance, the State of Israel confers on minority religions a monopoly in matters of personal status. 
See Sec. 51-57 of The Palestine Order in Council, 1922, which is still valid. 
 117 Certain aspects of the minority’s culture could be nationalized. For example, we see no reason why 
democracies should not include some national holidays to coincide with a minority group’s religious festivals, 
especially if the relevant minority is sizeable. In some countries, like Slovenia, South Africa, and Macedonia, 
the minority language is the official language of the state. See Languages Spoken in Each Country of the World, 
INFOPLEASE, http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0855611.html (last visited Nov. 17, 2017).  
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right to prevent inequality.118 Others, like Charles Taylor,119 disagree for two 
main reasons: 
First, any social rectification takes place gradually, and one should not 
expect it to be effectuated all at once. Second, the fact that one group 
does not receive full protection of its rights does not justify detracting 
from the protection granted to another group.120  
By way of analogy, just as the fact that the rights of citizens of a totalitarian 
state are curtailed does not justify undermining the rights of the citizens of a 
democratic neighbor, the fact that certain groups are unable to realize their right 
to national culture on a state level does not justify the denial of the right of 
members of national groups that can be realized. 
d. Justification on the Basis of Persecution 
Even those who are unconvinced by the attempt to establish the right to self-
determination in a nation-state on the right to culture may accept another 
justification—this rationale, which is in some ways more limited in scope, 
argues for the right of the Jewish people (and peoples like it, with relevant 
characterization) to a homeland. These justifications are based on the 
circumstances of Jewish people as a nation that has suffered fierce persecution 
throughout its history and is still an object of hatred. 
Some scholars, like A.B. Yehoshua, are of the opinion that the Holocaust 
revealed the fact that Jews could no longer exist without having a state of their 
own, and that “the right of survival” provides a normative justification for the 
establishment of a Jewish nation-state.121 The argument includes the notion that 
a person under serious threat may defend himself, even at the expense of the 
legitimate interests of a third-party, provided that this will not lead to the third-
party experiencing the same level of shortage or threat that the person himself is 
trying to escape from.122 Although there may not often be a justification to 
establish a nation-state, as it could violate the right to equality of citizens who 
are not among the preferred nation, it is justified when there is a nation under 
 
 118 See BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 492. 
 119 Charles Taylor, Why Do Nations Have to Become States?, in RECONCILING THE SOLITUDES: ESSAYS ON 
CANADIAN FEDERALISM & NATIONALISM 40 (G. Laforest ed., 1993). 
 120 Id.; BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 492. 
 121 BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 493–94. 
 122 In some ways, the rationale is not unlike the tort law doctrine/defense of necessity. See Ploof v. Putnam, 
71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908). 
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threat of persecution.123 This is true even if those citizens who may be affected 
bear no special responsibility for the plight of the persecuted, so long as it does 
not put them into the same predicament that the persecuted faced.124 
Yehoshua gives his argument in the context of a post-hoc rationalization, but 
in our opinion this argument is strong enough ab initio and would even obligate 
other nations to assist in the realization of this right, as there is a principal 
obligation of humanity to ensure that a persecuted group finds a haven. 
C. Application 
To be clear, assuming that a nation-state’s existence can be justified, it is not 
the case that this justification automatically extends to any practice that the 
nation-state claims is related or even necessary to the definition of the state as a 
nation-state. Each practice will still have to be reviewed to (a) determine the 
strength of the link between the practice and the justified nation-state, and (b) 
weigh the practice against the harm it could theoretically cause to minority 
rights. If we are correct that the arguments above justify the existence of a 
nation-state of Israel, the more focused question still remains: Does the Law of 
Return actually withstand this review? 
The first question can be answered with relative ease. The Law of Return is 
not only linked with the idea of the nation-state, but a nation-state is also 
required based on this idea. We explained that the right to self-determination in 
a nation-state is based on two main considerations: the right to culture and the 
right to protection from persecution.125 As Gans points out, each of the rationales 
leads one directly to the right to immigration: 
If the purpose of the right to self-determination is to protect the interest 
of members of national groups to adhere to their culture and to live 
within its framework, what is the point in recognizing this right without 
seeing the will of the members of these groups to migrate to where they 
have self-rule in order to realize their desire to adhere to the culture 
and live within its framework the justification of allowing them to do 
so? And if the purpose of self-determination of many national groups 
is to serve as a security anchor and a refuge from persecution for their 
 
 123 See ABRAHAM B. YEHOSHUA, FOR NORMALITY (1980) [Hebrew]. 
 124 See id. 
 125 See supra II(B)(2)(c)(i), II(B)(2)(d). 
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members, what is the point to recognize this right without recognizing 
their right to seek refuge as part of this self-determination.126 
These two considerations base the Law of Return on the legitimate interests of 
Israeli immigration applicants. To these, one can attach a third consideration 
concerning the interests of citizens of the state who are of Jewish nationality. It 
seems clear that if a people of a certain nationality have the right to self-
determination in any territory, then this right is accompanied by the right to take 
actions that will ensure the continued existence of that right. For our purposes, 
it is also apparent that one of the conditions defining any political entity as a 
nation-state is that that nation will constitute a clear majority of citizens in that 
state.127 Of course, not all means to achieve such a majority can be justified, but 
it seems that among the range of existing means for the preservation of the 
majority, giving priority to immigration to the people of that nation-state is a 
reasonable means.128 
What then do we do with the question about the degree of harm to citizens 
who do not belong to the majority group? We turn to this question in the next 
section. 
D. The Law of Return and the Geo-Political Reality 
As a general policy, it seems fitting that if a nation-state is entitled to prefer 
the national group members when formulating immigration policy, a somewhat 
preferential treatment in immigration should in due course be accorded to certain 
minority groups residing in it, especially if these minority groups are indigenous. 
Such a policy would greatly reduce the harm to members of the minority groups 
and the subjective sense of inferiority they experience. However, such a policy 
is contingent upon two conditions: First, that these minority groups are not 
accorded self-determination in another nation-state and, second, that these 
minority groups do not question the national character of the state in which they 
live and do not attempt to actually change it.129 The first condition is required 
because the aforementioned preference in the immigration policy stems from the 
desire to allow members of the minority group to benefit from the opportunity 
to live among members of their culture. If members of the minority group have 
 
 126 GANS, FROM RICHARD WAGNER TO THE RIGHT OF RETURN, supra note 104, at 207. 
 127 Learning to Live Together, UNESCO, https://www.globalconnect.socsci.uci.edu/files/webppts/ 
intro2intrelations/02%20-%20Nation-States.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 128 See generally GAVISON, supra note 49, at 39–41. 
 129 See generally GAVISON, supra note 49, at 39–41. 
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their own nation-state, their interest to live among their culture may be exercised 
in that state. This removes or at least weakens the commitment of another nation-
state, in which some members of the minority group live, to allow them to 
migrate into its territory. The second condition is implied because one cannot 
require members of a majority group in a nation-state to actively assist those 
seeking to repeal the national character of their state.  
In the Israeli context, the two conditions are not realized. As we know, Israel 
has faced difficult security challenges since its establishment.130 In fact, the 
conflict began even before the establishment of a state, from the date when it 
became clear that the Jews were actively operating to fulfill their desire for self-
determination in the Land of Israel.131 From that date, the country’s non-Jewish 
inhabitants started acting violently in order to thwart the fulfillment of the Jewish 
aspiration.132 
On November 29, 1947, the United Nations decided to resolve the bloody 
conflict by the partition plan, dividing the land of western Israel into two states—
an Arab-Palestinian state and a Jewish state.133 The Jewish community in the 
Land of Israel accepted the decision, while the Arab-Palestinian public rejected 
it and started a war in order to wipe out the Jewish community.134 
After the British military evacuated the area at the end of the U.N. mandate, 
Israel declared its independence and, at the same time, Arab armies invaded 
Israel and joined the battle against the Jewish community.135 The war ended with 
Israel’s victory, but much of the land between the Mediterranean Sea and the 
Jordan River remained under Arab control.136 Surprisingly, an independent 
Palestinian state was not established in that territory; the territory and its 
inhabitants were divided between Egypt (Gaza) and Jordan (the West Bank).137 
For many years, the Arab states continued to try to destroy the Jewish state.138 
During those years, Palestinian terrorist organizations worked alongside the 
 
 130 See CHARLES D. SMITH, PALESTINE AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 87–100 (Bedford/St. Martin’s, 
9th ed. 1992) 
 131 Id. at 152–174. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See id.; G.A. Res. 181, Partition Plan (Nov. 29, 1947); see AHRON BREGMAN, ISRAEL’S WARS: A 
HISTORY SINCE 1947 7–9 (Jeremy Black ed. 2000). 
 134 BREGMAN, supra note 133, at 9 (“If the Jews are going to take our land then by God we will throw them 
into the sea.”). 
 135 Id. at 26–27. 
 136 Id. at 13. 
 137 Id. at 32. 
 138 Id. at 40. 
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Arab armies.139 These organizations tried to tip the scale of the battle through 
acts of terror against the civilian population in Israel.140 
In the early 1990s, an historic breakthrough was achieved with the signing 
of a political agreement between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, at the base 
of which there was an agreement on mutual recognition and a division of the 
country into two states.141 Unfortunately, the agreement has not yet been fully 
realized.142 Without getting into the question of who is to blame, there are a 
number of facts of particular relevance to our purpose. 
First, it has become increasingly clear that even if the Palestinian leadership, 
or at least part of it, agrees to accept the fact of Israel’s existence, it is not 
prepared to recognize the Jewish people’s right to self-determination within its 
borders.143 In other words, there is a limited willingness to recognize Israel as 
an independent state, but there is no willingness to recognize Israel as the nation-
state of the Jewish people.144 This unwillingness to recognize the right to self-
determination of the Jewish people is not limited to the leadership of the 
Palestinian public in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip;145 many of the leaders 
of the Palestinian minority in Israel also refuse to recognize the legitimacy of 
Israel as the Jewish nation-state.146 
The refusal of the Palestinians on both sides of the Green Line (separating 
Israel proper and the West Bank and Gaza Strip)147 to recognize Israel as the 
Jewish nation-state seems puzzling, especially given that the State of Israel has 
repeatedly been willing to allow the creation of the nation-state of the Palestinian 
 
 139 Id. at 33. 
 140 Id. at 49–50. 
 141 Declaration of Principles, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/ 
foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/declaration%20of%20principles.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 142 Faisal Al Yafai, The Dream of Oslo Has Not Died, It Has Just Faded Away, THE NATIONAL (Sept.  
12, 2017). 
 143 See, e.g., Gabriel Avner, Abu Mazen: ‘We Will Not Recognize Israel as a Jewish State’, JERUSALEM 
ONLINE (Mar. 8, 2014, 1:49 AM), http://www.jerusalemonline.com/news/middle-east/israeli-palestinian-
relations/abu-mazen-we-will-not-recognize-israel-as-a-jewish-state-4131. 
 144 See id. 
 145 Id. See At UN, Israel’s Netanyahu Says Conflict is ‘Not About Settlements’ But Existence of a Jewish 
State, U.N. NEWS CTR. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=55041#. 
WbS0nNOGM6h. 
 146 See THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR THE HEADS OF THE ARAB LOCAL AUTHORITIES IN ISRAEL, FUTURE 
VISION OF PALESTINIAN ARABS IN ISRAEL 5, 11, 28 (Ghaida Rinawie-Zoabi ed., 2006). 
 147 See Fact Sheets: The 1967 Border – The “Green Line”, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www. 
jewishvirtuallibrary.org/the-1967-border-the-quot-green-line-quot (last visited Nov. 17, 2017); see also At UN, 
Israel’s Netanyahu Says Conflict is ‘Not About Settlements’ But Existence of a Jewish State, supra note 145. 
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people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip.148 Either way, this refusal could 
also explain the claim of the Palestinians that, if and when a permanent 
settlement is achieved, the descendants of Palestinians who left the territory of 
Israel within the Green Line during and as a result of wars will have the right to 
return to their original homes.149 To be clear, this migration into the State of 
Israel is not a “Right of Return” to areas of the Land of Israel which will be 
included in the sovereign territory of the Palestinian state, a right that no one 
disputes. In Israel, there is a broad consensus against this requirement for the 
simple reason that accepting it will dramatically change the demographic 
balance in Israel and question the legitimacy of Israel’s definition as a Jewish 
nation-state.150 
The Palestinian aspiration to move a massive Palestinian wave of 
immigration into Israel has already been partially realized. Immediately after the 
signing of the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements,151 a large wave of Palestinians began moving from Gaza and the 
West Bank into the Green Line.152 Over a period of approximately eight years, 
about 140,000 Palestinians immigrated to Israel, most of them via a “family 
reunification” rule enshrined in Israel’s immigration laws.153 These immigrants 
joined the Israeli citizens who belong to the Palestinian minority.154 Only in 
2002 did Israel begin to limit the immigration; allowing the immigration to 
continue would have undermined the justification of the definition of Israel as 
 
 148 See, e.g., Ben Birnbaum & Amir Tibon, The Explosive, Inside Story of How John Kerry Built an Israel-
Palestine Peace Plan—and Watched It Crumble, NEW REPUBLIC (July 20, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/ 
article/118751/how-israel-palestine-peace-deal-died; Daniel Meir-Levi, 31 Opportunities for Statehood 
Squandered in Favor of Genocide, FRONTPAGE MAG (July 14, 2011), http://www.frontpagemag.com/fpm/ 
98517/31-opportunities-statehood-squandered-favor-david-meir-levi. 
 149 See, e.g., The Democratic Constitution: Draft, ADALAH (Mar. 20, 2007), https://www.adalah.org/ 
uploads/oldfiles/Public/files/democratic_constitution-english.pdf. 
 150 See, e.g., Na’ama Carmi, Immigration Policy: Between Demographic Considerations and Preservation 
of Culture, 2 L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS. 14, 22, 25, 29 (2008); see also CHAIM GANS, A JUST ZIONISM: ON THE 
MORALITY OF THE JEWISH STATE 84–93, 132-33 (2008); GAVISON, supra note 49, at 33–34. 
 151 See The Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements, KNESSET (Sept. 13, 1993), 
www.knesset.gov.il/process/docs/oslo_eng.htm. 
 152 Information provided by the then Deputy Attorney General, Meni Mazuz, in a discussion of the 
Knesset’s Interior Committee on July 14, 2003, on the proposed Temporary Provision Law, 
www.knesset.gov.il/protocols/data/html/pnim/2003-07-14-01.html (Hebrew). 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. According to the Central Bureau of Statistics, in 2013, Arabs constitute 20.6% of the Israeli 
population. See Press Release, Selected Data from the New Statistical Abstract of Israel No. 64-2013, CENT. 
BUREAU STATISTICS (Sept. 16, 2013), http://www.cbs.gov.il/reader/newhodaot/hodaa_template_eng.html? 
hodaa=201311255. 
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the Jewish nation-state,155 although this restriction was actually justified on 
security grounds and not due to demographic reasons.156 
The circumstances described have a double implication. First, they show that 
the two prerequisites we set out above as conditions for recognizing the special 
status of the Palestinian minority in Israel as part of an official immigration 
policy are not met in this case.157 Second, they provide an independent 
justification for the Law of Return, in addition to the justifications described 
above.158 In a reality in which the legitimacy of the definition of Israel as a 
Jewish nation-state is constantly being questioned—a reality in which demands 
are openly made to erode the Jewish majority in a way that would weaken the 
existence of the demographic prerequisite to justify the national character of 
Israel—it is logical and morally justifiable for Israel to continue its attempt to 
tilt the demographic balance back in favor of the Jewish side by means of a 
preferential immigration policy toward the Jewish diaspora. 
E. Conversion and Ethnicity 
Setting criteria for immigration is a common practice in all Western 
countries.159 Yet another criticism of the Law of Return is based on the argument 
that it is not right for the law to distinguish the way it does, allegedly on 
problematic racial and ethnic criteria.160 In the international human rights 
discourse, such criteria are contested because they are neither self-selected nor 
are they subject to modification.161 It is relevant to point out that international 
 
 155 Citizenship and Entry into Israel Law (Temporary Provision), 5763-2003, SH No. 1901 p. 544 (Isr.). 
 156 See BAKSHI & SAPIR, supra note 91, at 494. 
 157 Michael Omer-Man, This Week in History: Jewish Right to Aliya Becomes Law, JERUSALEM POST (July 
8, 2011). 
 158 See id. 
 159 See Jennifer L. Hochschild & John Mollenkopf¸ The Complexities of Immigration: Why Western 
Countries Struggle with Immigration Politics and Policies, in DELIVERING CITIZENSHIP (Bertelsmann Stifung, 
European Policy Centre, Migration Policy Institute eds., 2009). 
 160 See Roselle Tekiner, Jewish Nationality Status as the Basis for Institutionalized Discrimination in Israel, 
MIDDLE EAST POL’Y COUNCIL (1986), http://mepc.org/journal/middle-east-policy-archives/jewish-nationality-
status-basis-institutionalized-racial-discrimination-israel?print. 
 161 Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note 96, at 268–69. As Orgad and Ruthizer point out:  
Applying international human rights law to an immigration context is not an easy task. First, 
international law norms are not always enforceable in domestic law. In the United States, for 
example, individuals do not have self-executing rights not to be discriminated against based on 
international conventions. Second, article 1(2) to the CERD makes clear that it does not apply to 
distinctions between “citizens and non-citizens.” Third, article 1(3) to the CERD provides that it 
should not be interpreted in any way to deprive States Parties’ power on issues of “nationality” and 
“citizenship or naturalization,” provided that the policies “do not discriminate against any 
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law specifically excludes immigration policies from the general prohibition 
against differentiation based on racial and ethnic criteria.162 Article 1(1) of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial 
Discrimination provides that: 
“racial discrimination” shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, 
cultural or any other field of public life.163 
While this is possibly the broadest definition of racial discrimination,164 it does 
not include religion. Critics argue that such immigration policies are nonetheless 
repugnant from a moral standpoint.165 
The fact of the matter is that the premise on which the Law of Return 
operates, whether on racial and/or ethnic distinctions, is not self-evident. Indeed, 
while “belonging” to the Jewish people is a prerequisite for application of the 
Law of Return, this “belonging” is demonstrably not contingent on racial or 
ethnic factors.166 Any person, regardless of race or ethnicity, is able to join the 
Jewish people, even if genealogically he or she has not a single drop of Jewish 
 
particular nationality.” In interpreting this clause, the U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination has recalled that discrimination occurs only if the criteria “are not applied pursuant 
to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the achievement of this aim.” That is, racial 
discrimination may be permissible under the CERD after fulfilling some conditions. Indeed, the 
International Court of Justice held that “international law leaves it to each State to lay down the 
rules governing the grant of its nationality.” Fourth, article 1(1) to the CERD defines racial 
discrimination only when it comes to discrimination of “human rights and fundamental freedoms.” 
As Professor Legomsky noted, the question whether entry and access to citizenship have become 
“human rights and fundamental freedoms,” which fall under the CERD’s definition, is at least 
controversial. And lastly, it is doubtful whether admission criteria fall under the protection of the 
CERD. International treaties usually apply within the state territory, or to people subjecting to its 
jurisdiction. The European Court of Human Rights ruled that under “international law, the 
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial,” and that treaties are not “designed to 
be applied throughout the world. 
 162 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 1(3), Dec. 21, 
1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
 163 Id. art. 1(1). 
 164 KRISTIN HENRARD, DEVISING AN ADEQUATE SYSTEM OF MINORITY PROTECTION: INDIVIDUAL HUMAN 
RIGHTS, MINORITY RIGHTS AND THE RIGHT TO SELF DETERMINATION 197 (2000). 
 165 See Louis Henkin, An Immigration Policy for a Just Society?, 31 San Diego L. Rev. 1017, 1018–19 
(1994). See generally, Tekiner, supra note 160. 
 166 See Clayman, supra note 14. 
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blood in his or her veins.167 Under these circumstances, it is not clear at all that 
the aforementioned moral objection to the Law of Return should even be taken 
into consideration.168 
By way of response, one could argue that, although the option for acquiring 
the Right of Return through conversion does not infringe on the right to equality 
because it is not based on ethnic criteria, it still infringes on another right—the 
freedom of religion—because joining the Jewish people involves joining the 
Jewish religion.169 
However, the right to freedom of religion is not affected in this case for two 
reasons. First, religious freedom is customarily understood to protect a person 
from being forced or coerced into actions that are against his or her religious 
conscience.170 Here, no one is forced to convert to Judaism; in fact, no one is 
even encouraged to take this step.171 An interpretation of freedom of religion 
that would include within it a prohibition of the above-mentioned practice is, in 
our opinion, undesirable in that it makes any benefit that is contingent on some 
religious affiliation suspect from the perspective of religion and conscience. 
Second, even if we adopt this broad interpretation of freedom of religion, it 
is still doubtful that conversion-based conditions imposed on the application of 
the Law of Return would be considered an affront to the freedom of religion. 
The conversion that is required to trigger the benefits of the Law of Return is not 
of a religious nature in the strict sense of the term. 
To clarify this point, we return to the historical review of the Law of Return 
that we described earlier in Part I. As explained, while the amendment to the 
Law of Return did define who is a Jew, it left open the question of which 
conversions shall be deemed to comply with the Law. This gave rise to an 
ongoing dispute between the different streams of Judaism. On one side, the 
Orthodox demand exclusive rights to conversion. On the other, the more liberal 
 
 167 OT/Jewish Bibl Bamidbar: Numbers ch. 9 v. 14. (“One statute shall apply to you, to the proselyte and 
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 168 See What is the Difference between Race and Ethnicity?, LIVE SCIENCE (May 9, 2012), https://www. 
livescience.com/33903-difference-race-ethnicity.html. 
 169 HCJ 2597/99 Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior 59(6) PD 267, 280 (2005) (Isr.) (“Conversion 
is a religious concept. It invokes an act ‘of taking upon oneself the burden of Judaism and joining the Jewish 
People.’”) (citing HCJ 487/71 Clark v. Minister of Interior). 
 170 See Gideon Sapir & Daniel Statman, Why Freedom of Religion Does Not Include Freedom from 
Religion, 24 L. & PHIL. 467, 475 (2005). 
 171 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD: TRACTATE YEVAMOTH, Folio 47(a). 
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streams seek recognition of their conversions, too.172 We also noted that, in 
2005, the Supreme Court of Israel ruled on this dispute and determined that, for 
the purposes of the Law of Return, the State was required to recognize any 
conversion carried out in a recognized Jewish community abroad by any one of 
the mainstream Jewish denominations.173 
Since 1893, the official position of the Central Conference of American 
Rabbis (CCAR), the rabbinic umbrella organization of the Reform movement, 
has been that it is lawful and proper for any officiating rabbi, assisted by no 
fewer than two associates, “to accept into the sacred covenant of Israel . . . any 
honorable and intelligent person . . . without any initiatory rite, ceremony, or 
observance whatever . . . .”174 Unlike the immigration oaths of countries like 
Hungary, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Singapore,175 the conversion 
process to Reform Judaism does not even require a single mention of God.176 
Instead, like in the immigration processes of the United States and the United 
Kingdom, people can choose whether or not to mention God.177 
Note that we express no opinion here on the validity of reform conversion.178 
All we claim is that the process can be classified as more cultural than religious 
in the conventional sense of the word “religious.” If we are correct, then from a 
legal standpoint, the Law of Return provides for every single person the 
possibility to immigrate to Israel, provided that they accept and establish a clear 
link to the cultural characteristics of the State. Such a demand should be 
acceptable even to those who are most careful about the moral obligation to 
avoid discrimination on racial, ethnic, or even religious grounds. 
 
  172 See Shachar, supra note 25, at 244–48 (discussing the various definitions that were put forth by both the 
Orthodox and liberal factions in Israel prior to the adoption of the Amendment to the Right of Return’s official 
definition).  
  173 HCJ 2597/99 Rodriguez-Tushbeim v. Minister of Interior 59(6) PD 267, 280 (2005) (Isr.). 
 174 David Philipson, Kaufmann Kohler & H. Pereira Mendes, The Declaration of the Conference on the 
Admission of Proselytes, Adopted at the New York Meeting in 1892, JEWISH ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www. 
jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/4592-conferences-rabbinical (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
 175 See 1993 Art. 7(4) Hungarian Citizenship Act (Act 55 of 1993); Citizenship Act 1977, sch 1 (N.Z.); 
Commonwealth Act Rep. Act No. 473, § 12 (June 17, 1939) (Phil.); Oath of Renunciation, Allegiance and 
Loyalty, Second Schedule of the Singapore Constitution of the Republic of Singapore. 
 176 Uriel Heilman, Conversion to Judaism: Denomination to Denomination, JEWISH TELEGRAPHIC AGENCY 
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.jta.org/2014/10/06/life-religion/conversion-to-judaism-denomination-by-denomination/3. 
 177 See, e.g., British Nationality Act, 1981, c. 61, § 5(1) (“I, [name], [swear by Almighty God] [do solemnly, 
sincerely and truly affirm and declare] that, on becoming a British citizen, I will be faithful and bear true 
allegiance to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II, her heirs, and successors, according to law.”) (2008). In the United 
States, “God” is in the standard text, but one can choose to omit it. 
 178 8 C.F.R. § 337.1 (2008). 
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While the use of racial immigration classifications is not clearly 
impermissible under international law, the use of cultural and nationality-based 
restrictions seems to be explicitly permissible. As Orgad and Ruthizer note:  
[I]n 1984, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights ruled that 
preferences in naturalization criteria issued by Costa Rica for nationals 
of Central American countries, Spaniards and Ibero-Americans is 
compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights and 
presents no case of discrimination. . . . The Court justified granting 
preferences for Central American nationals by noting that they are 
“closer historical, cultural and spiritual bonds with the people of Costa 
Rica . . . [Central American nationals will] identify more readily with 
the traditional beliefs, values and institutions of Costa Rica, which the 
state has the right and duty to preserve.” Similarly, the European Court 
of Human Rights upheld nationality-based distinctions when there is 
“an objective and reasonable justification” in such a policy.179 
Such, as we shall demonstrate, is the case for Israel and the Law of Return. 
III. THE CONTEXTUAL ARGUMENT 
A. The Argument 
Having established that such a law is theoretically permissible, perhaps on 
the grounds of cultural preservation, we now examine the Law of Return in 
practice. To review, the Law of Return grants Jewish people an unconditional 
right to immigrate to Israel and become citizens.180 While the Israeli populous 
nearly unanimously supported the Law of Return in the past, the consensus 
among the Jewish majority in recent years has been somewhat tempered with 
those who want to completely eliminate the Right of Return and those who seek 
only to qualify it. 181 In this section, we will first describe the various arguments 
against the current arrangement, then evaluate and respond to them. 
While it is correct that respect for the right to culture indeed requires nation-
states to grant to the members of the nation living in the diaspora an 
unconditional right to immigrate, this right is limited in time. Once a person is 
 
 179 Orgad & Ruthizer, supra note 96, at 269–70 (2010). 
 180 See Law of Return 5710–1950, supra note 13. 
 181 See generally Altschul, supra note 18, at 1367. 
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granted the right to immigrate to his nation-state and does not realize it, the right 
expires and he can no longer automatically claim to uphold it.182 
Additionally, many immigrants today are not identified in any significant 
way with the Jewish people, its culture, or its destiny; therefore, the main reason, 
and sometimes the only reason, for their wish to immigrate to Israel is the desire 
to improve their standard of living.183 As a result, so the argument goes, these 
applicants cannot base their applications to immigrate to Israel on the right to 
culture; thus, the State of Israel may (and perhaps should) deny them the 
automatic right to immigrate to Israel and avoid favoring them over other 
immigration applicants.184 
Yet another consideration mentioned in this context is the effect the 
migration of these people will have on Israel’s cultural identity.185 If many of 
those eligible through the Law of Return are not culturally identified with the 
Jewish nation, some of whom even have an alternative cultural identity, their 
immigration to Israel would actually dilute and weaken the Jewish cultural 
identity of Israel, which contrasts with the interests of the Jewish majority.186 
Finally, today, the Jewish people in most parts of the world are not exposed 
to persecution, and their status in their home countries is strong, unlike the 
situation in the first years of the State.187 This relies upon the premise that during 
the early years of the State, the majority of the immigrants were either survivors 
of the crematoriums—persons who could not or did not want to return to their 
home countries—or refugees from Arab countries who were persecuted in their 
own lands because of their Jewish identity. Contrarily, many immigrants today 
have not experienced special difficulties on the basis of their nationality.188 This 
claim then seeks to deny the relevance of the alleged justification on the basis of 
persecution. 
 
 182 See NA’AMA CARMI, IMMIGRATION AND THE LAW OF RETURN: IMMIGRATION RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITS 
53–55 (2003); Asa Kasher, Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of Return, 15 ISR. Y.B. 
HUM. RTS. 101, 112 (1985). 
 183 See Carmi, supra note 150, at 29. 
 184 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 62–64.  
 185 See Carmi, supra note 150, at 33. 
 186 Id. at 69, 111. 
 187 See, e.g., Shachar, supra note 25. 
 188 See id. (quoting DON PERETZ & GIDEON DORON, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF ISRAEL 62 (3d ed. 
1997)). 
SAPIR_GOLDFEDER GALLEYPROOFS2 2/1/2018 2:59 PM 
2018] LAW, RELIGION, AND IMMIGRATION 235 
B. Discussion 
1. The Right of Return as an Identity Characterizer 
Below, we will discuss the various arguments cited for a call to reform the 
immigration policy. But before we do that, we would like to stress an important 
fact, which is relevant to the normative discussion. 
As mentioned above, two groups exist among those seeking to reform the 
immigration policy: those who propose to eliminate the preference given to the 
Jewish people and those who offer to maintain the preference but seek to cancel 
the automatic right, which would effectively expand the State’s discretion and 
allow it to set conditions for the absorption of Jewish immigrants and the 
subsequent granting of citizenship.189 The second proposal is consistent with the 
migration arrangements in many nation-states that give preference to national 
diasporas in their migration arrangements but retain the right to set additional 
criteria and to exercise discretion within the framework of the decision on 
whether to accept migration applicants even if they belong to the preferred 
national group.190 Thus, at least from a comparative perspective, the proposal to 
switch from a policy of granting an automatic right to a policy of a contingent 
preference is not far-reaching. However, in circumstances unique to Israel, it is 
still no less than a revolution—one that could significantly change the identity 
of Israel. 
During the Knesset debate on the eve of passing of the Law of Return, Prime 
Minister David Ben-Gurion said the following: 
The Law of Return recognizes our country’s major purpose, the 
purpose of ingathering of the exiles. This law stipulates that it is not 
the state that gives the diaspora Jews the right to settle in it, rather this 
right is inherent in every Jew as a Jew . . . this right predates the State 
of Israel and it is it that built the state. The origin of this right is in the 
historical connection that never stopped between the people and the 
homeland.191 
 
 189 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 14. 
 190 For a further discussion of European states with similar considerations, such as Germany, Greece, and 
Ireland, see YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49, at 126–131. 
 191 DK (1950) 5032 (Isr.). See generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the 
Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50. 
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In legal terms, Prime Minister Ben-Gurion sought to explain that the Law of 
Return is not a constitutive law that creates the right of Jews to return to Israel, 
but rather a declarative law, merely stating the existence of this right.192 
This position of Ben-Gurion—that the immigration of Jews to Israel is based 
on the inherent right of every Jew in the world and not, as it is usually 
understood, on a benefit conferred by the State of Israel—has enjoyed a broad 
consensus among members of the Knesset. Based on this premise, there were 
Knesset members who opposed including in the Law any restrictions that would 
limit the entry of Jews in some cases.193 In the end, it was decided to include a 
few restrictions in the law, but, as explained above, these restrictions were very 
limited in scope.194 
Prime Minister Ben-Gurion’s declaration did not remain empty rhetoric. It 
has withstood the test of reality and has dictated the immigration absorption 
policy of the State of Israel since its inception. During Israel’s early years, a 
large number of refugees were absorbed; in the thirty months between the 
Proclamation of Statehood and the middle of 1951, more than half a million Jews 
made Aliyah at a rate of 15,000–20,000 Olim (returners) per month.195 Thus, 
over the course of the first three years of the country’s existence, the Jewish 
population in the country doubled.196 The state barely restricted the flow of 
immigrants, despite the fact that it imposed a very heavy burden on the country’s 
economy and reshaped the structure of Israeli society.197 
The government and the public in Israel showed a similar commitment in the 
1990s when, over the course of several years, the country absorbed roughly one 
million immigrants from the former Soviet Union.198 Israel’s economic situation 
was far better, and the number of its citizens was much larger then, but even 
 
 192 See generally Sapir, How Should a Court Deal with a Primary Question That the Legislature Seeks to 
Avoid? The Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew as an Illustration, supra note 50. 
 193 DK (1950) 2044 (Isr.). 
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here, the absorption of the immigrants demanded great effort and brought about 
significant change in the social structure of the State.199 
Thus, it would not be an exaggeration to describe the commitment, rhetorical 
and practical, of Israel’s unconditional absorption of Jewish immigration as one 
of the most important and defining elements of the country’s national identity. 
Even if canceling this commitment would correspond with the dominant trend 
among nation-states, in the Israeli context, it would at least mean giving up one 
of the most fundamental and identity-building characteristics of the State. 
2. The Question of Time and Motivation 
The first argument in favor of narrowing the automatic Right of Return is 
based on the long amount of time that has passed since the establishment of the 
State of Israel.200 The reasoning is that, even if we recognize the right of one to 
immigrate to the State of his nationality, it is legitimate and even required to 
limit this right in time.201 This is a weak prima facie argument since human 
rights—particularly personal and fundamental ones—are never limited in 
time.202 For example, it is inconceivable to think that a person who has not 
expressed himself regarding a certain matter at the first opportunity would lose 
his freedom of speech on the matter at some later date. 
One could say that, in this case, the elapsed time does not negate the 
existence of the right to immigrate—it only serves as an indication that the 
conditions for its existence are not realized. As noted, the right to immigrate to 
a nation-state is based on the recognition of the individual’s interest to live in a 
cultural-political framework best suited to one’s cultural identity. It is possible, 
then, to claim that the fact that a person avoided immigrating to his nation-state 
for a long time, although it was possible, shows that his decision to immigrate 
now is not based on the interest in question, and therefore he has no vested right 
to that. We are of the opinion, however, that such a conclusion completely 
ignores the complexity of the human existence. Life’s realities change 
frequently, and people change, develop, and mature over the course of their 
lives. Change in a person’s conduct may arise from differing circumstances or 
shifting priorities, and the fact that a given individual did not exercise his or her 
 
 199 YAKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN, supra note 49, at 175. 
 200 See GAVISON, supra note 49, at 55–56. 
 201 See id. at 46. 
 202 Human Rights Principles, UNITED NATIONS POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/resources/ 
human-rights-principles (last visited Nov. 17, 2017). 
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right to immigrate in the past cannot teach us anything about his or her motives 
now when he or she is asking to realize this right. Moreover, even if we accept 
the above, it is at most only relevant to adult immigration applicants who have 
had a real opportunity to immigrate. We cannot raise it with regard to youths or 
anyone else who may wish to immigrate to Israel but have not yet had a realistic 
chance to try. 
It is also interesting to evaluate the normative premise behind the evidential 
argument we rejected. The assumption is that it is not enough to be a formal 
member in a particular nation to give a person the right to immigrate to the State 
of that nation; seemingly, the feeling is that the right is reserved only to members 
of the national group seeking to immigrate based on cultural-national motives. 
This assumption has far-reaching significance well beyond the question of 
whether it is legitimate to limit the time to exercise the right to immigrate. If we 
adopt this assumption, it may justify (or perhaps even require) pre-screening all 
applicants for immigration and accepting only those whose motives prove 
suitable. 
In theory, this might be a justified claim. As noted, the right to immigrate to 
the nation-state derives from the right to self-determination.203 The main 
justification for the right to self-determination is the justification of the right to 
culture.204 If one’s wish to immigrate to one’s nation-state is not based on one’s 
recognized interest in preserving and strengthening one’s cultural identity, he 
cannot make use of the justification from the right to culture, and therefore 
cannot claim for himself the right to automatic immigration. 
In practice, however, how does one determine the motives for immigration? 
It is quite difficult to discover the motivations of immigration applicants.205 In 
fact, it is much more effective to use an objective test to gauge the degree of 
association of an immigration applicant to his national culture, as some countries 
already do. In this context, we can examine data like the fluency of the 
immigration applicant in the national language, a basic knowledge of national 
history, and, in the case where the nation is traditionally identified with a 
particular religion, even familiarity with basic elements of that religion.206 
 
 203 See supra Part II(B). 
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Indeed, many nation-states that give priority to immigration applicants from 
their national diaspora pose such tests as a prerequisite for granting the right to 
immigrate.207 Of course, you can connect these prerequisites to the interests of 
nation-states, the desire to ensure that immigration applicants will be culturally 
absorbed and that the cultural element that unites the State’s citizens will not 
weaken due to the absorption of unsuitable immigration applicants.208 However, 
the placing of these conditions can also be explained as stemming from the basic 
assumption that the right to immigrate is only given to those who need it in order 
to strengthen their own cultural identity. 
3. The Question of National Interest 
On a related note, giving preference to the people of one nation in 
immigration can be based not only on the right of the migration applicants, but 
also on the interest of the members of the majority group in the state to 
strengthen their national culture.209 As noted earlier in this article, some argue 
that in terms of policy, the current arrangements in the Law of Return do not 
serve this interest, and in fact, the arrangements run counter to and harm it.210 
Critics point out that even if in the past the majority of the immigrants who came 
to Israel under the Law of Return had a clear Jewish identity, and the desire to 
immigrate was due, among other reasons, to cultural-national reasons, currently 
many immigrants are not culturally identified with the Jewish nation at all, and 
their immigration stems from a desire to simply improve their standard of 
living.211 In this reality, the Law of Return does not strengthen the Jewish 
identity of Israel, but harms it. Below, we will examine this argument. 
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a. The Nature of Immigration in Recent Years 
Today, the relative weight of immigrants lacking a cultural affinity to the 
Jewish people in the general immigrant population is heavier than its relative 
weight in the past.212 The difference is due to two main reasons. The first is the 
improvement in the general economic situation and the security of Israel.213 
During the first decades of Israel’s existence, a real existential threat was present 
and always felt.214 Today, the situation is somewhat different. While Israel still 
faces complex security challenges, Israel’s military is powerful and effective and 
Israel has many means at its disposal that reinforce its deterrent capability.215 
The general feeling is that if no massive use of non-conventional weapons is 
launched against it (i.e., as in the threat posed to it by Iran), Israel’s very 
existence is not under immediate threat.216 
Israel’s economic situation is firm, too.217 Despite the fact that, throughout 
its existence, Israel has been forced to devote a large portion of its budget to 
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defense measures and operations,218 and, unlike some of its neighbors, it has no 
significant natural resources within its borders,219 the Israeli economy is stable, 
its foreign currency reserves are high, and its national product per capita is 
significantly higher than other Middle Eastern countries.220 Israel is considered 
a high-tech superpower,221 and many technology companies have established 
Research and Development centers in Israel.222 The economic crisis felt 
throughout the Western countries in recent years was almost unnoticed in Israel, 
and it is considered a legitimate member in the community of developed 
countries.223 In light of the prosperity and the relative stability in security, it is 
understandable why many eligible for return exercise their right to immigrate to 
Israel even in the absence of a special relationship to Judaism or Jewish 
culture.224 
A second reason for the increase in immigration among people lacking an 
affinity to Israel is tied to the history of the Jewish Diaspora in the Soviet Union 
during the twentieth century and the amendments to the Law of Return of 1970 
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that added family members of Jews to the circle of eligibility.225 After the 
Holocaust that obliterated the majority of European Jews, most of the survivors 
emigrated from the continent—some to Israel and some to other countries.226 
With the establishment of the nation-state, a large immigration influx of Jews 
from Arab countries took place because of the persecution that they had been 
experiencing.227 These changes made the Jewish community in the Soviet Union 
the second largest Jewish diaspora, after the United States.228 Since the time of 
the Bolshevik Revolution, the Soviet government had consistently persecuted 
religion in general—and the Jewish religion in particular.229 Additionally, during 
the Cold War, the ties between Soviet Jews and the rest of the Jewish people 
were severed.230 These two factors weakened the cultural affinity of Soviet Jews 
to Judaism, as reflected, among other things, by a high rate of intermarriage.231 
Taken together, the two amendments of 1970 created a somewhat 
inconsistent arrangement: the new law defined a “Jew” for the purposes of 
Return according to an almost religious definition, but, at the same time, it 
expanded the extent of Aliyah eligibility to include the relatives of a Jew, even 
if the eligible individuals are not connected to Judaism or to the Jewish people.232 
On one hand, this expansion of eligibility to return significantly expanded the 
number of those eligible to exercise the right of return in the Soviet Union.233 
On the other hand, it diluted the relationship between most members of this 
group and the Jewish people, a relationship that, as noted, was already weak after 
so many years of persecution.234 
Despite this reality, until the beginning of the 1990s, the immigration to 
Israel from the Soviet Union was still of an ideological nature, partly because 
the Soviet Union impeded the path of immigration applicants, and the Soviet 
government persecuted and jailed many of those who wanted to immigrate to 
Israel.235 Under these circumstances, the ones who insisted and sometimes 
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managed to break through the Iron Curtain and immigrate to Israel were 
primarily characterized by a strong Jewish consciousness and a desire to express 
it.236 However, with the fall of the Communist Bloc, the gates of the Soviet 
Union opened wide and a great wave of immigration began.237 A precarious 
economic situation in the Soviet Union encouraged many who were eligible to 
immigrate to try their luck in the Holy Land.238 In the first few years afterwards, 
many of the immigrants who arrived still had some cultural affinity with 
Judaism.239 At some point, while the main potential of ideological-cultural 
immigration was exhausted, the number of immigrants with no Jewish affinity 
grew.240 
b. The Effect of the Change on the Nature of Israeli Society 
The description of the change in nature of the immigration to Israel is indeed 
relevant to clarify whether giving the right to unrestricted immigration is 
consistent with the interests of the Jewish majority in the land. However, in our 
opinion, using those numbers alone, one cannot reach a clear conclusion; there 
is a real need to examine what happens to immigrants under the Law of Return 
after they become Israeli citizens. Although an exhaustive research study has 
not yet been conducted, the existing data indicates that an overwhelming 
majority of immigrants to Israel still fit into the Jewish majority and adopt its 
culture, even if not practicing its religion.241 This is true especially with regard 
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to those who immigrated at a young age and with regard to the second generation 
of the immigrant families.242 The difference between younger and older 
immigrants regarding integration is natural and familiar in all countries that 
absorb immigration, but is particularly evident in Israel. Israel has a lengthy 
mandatory military service.243 The service, which involves intensive exposure 
to the Jewish-Israeli culture and contribution to the society and the nation, 
strengthens the affinity of the immigrants and of the second generation to Israel 
and to the Jewish people.244 In addition, the Israeli military invests considerable 
time and effort to expose the immigrant soldiers to the national culture and the 
Jewish religion, even helping those interested to go through the conversion 
process.245 
If, over time, a considerable number of immigrants did avoid being 
integrated into the Jewish society and culture, it might strengthen the argument 
that the provision of an unconditional right to immigration is against the interests 
of the Jewish majority.246 However, once it becomes clear that most immigrants 
eventually integrate into the Jewish-Israeli culture, the argument that the main 
interest of the Jewish majority is to strengthen and preserve its culture is 
weakened. This weakening is directly due to the automatic absorption of 
immigrants under the Law of Return.247 
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Another indication that the massive absorption of immigrants lacking a 
strong affinity to Judaism does not harm the Jewish cultural identity of the Israeli 
society can be found in the fact that public opinion polls conducted in Israel 
every few years show that, in general, the cultural-national identity of Israeli 
Jews has become stronger over time.248 
c. The National Interest Against Changing the Law 
The data provided thus far show that granting unrestricted immigration rights 
to Diaspora Jewry is not contrary to the interest of the Jewish majority in 
Israel.249 Below, we will describe a number of considerations that establish the 
much stronger claim that granting an unconditional immigration right coincides 
with the Jewish interest. 
The existence of a solid majority of members of a nationality group in a 
specific territory is a prerequisite for recognizing their right to self-determination 
in this territory.250 In the Israeli-Palestinian context, the demographic aspect has 
a special weight both in the debate about the future of the territories and within 
the framework of the immigration policy debate in Israel regarding Palestinians 
living in the Palestinian territories and in Arab countries. As we explained, the 
Jewish identity of Israel within the Green Line is not a self-evident reality for 
several reasons, including: the attempt of many Palestinians to immigrate to 
Israel;251 the demand of the Palestinian leadership to give the descendants of the 
refugees a right of return to the Green Line;252 and the refusal of the leadership 
of the Palestinian minority in Israel to accept the Jewish identity of Israel.253 
Under these circumstances, the Jewish majority in Israel likely has a particularly 
strong interest in establishing, reinforcing, and expanding its numerical 
dominance. One of the effective ways to achieve this goal would be to 
significantly increase absorption.254 As long as most immigrants eventually join 
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the Jewish majority, the goal is achieved, even if some of them were not 
culturally identified as Jews upon arrival.255 Placing significant restrictions on 
the automatic right to immigrate to Israel will inevitably lead to a significant 
decrease in the volume of immigration and would harm the long-term Jewish 
interest to strengthen its numerical dominance in Israel.256 
Placing restrictions on Jews’ right to immigrate to Israel is contrary to the 
Israeli interest for an additional reason. The State of Israel maintains a strong 
relationship with the Diaspora for the benefit of both sides. Israel is a central 
identity element in the self-definition of Diaspora Jews and serves as a source of 
pride for many of them.257 On their end, Diaspora Jews provide Israel with a lot 
of financial and political support.258 The affinity between Israel and the Jewish 
Diaspora is based, in part, on the premise that every Jew has the right to become 
a citizen of Israel, which he or she can exercise at will. This grants every Jewish 
person, wherever they may be, the secure feeling that there is always a 
welcoming home—even away from home.259An erosion of this right will not 
end the relationship between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora, but it will certainly 
weaken the mutual commitment, which Israel’s Jewish majority group has a 
strong interest in maintaining and cultivating. 
d. If We Do Need to Limit, Who Should Be Limited? 
So far, we have explained why Israel’s national interest does not support 
setting conditions on the right of automatic immigration granted in the Law of 
Return. However, in our opinion, there is a certain justice in the opposite claim 
with regard to a particular group, which is described below. 
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The Law of Return uses an ostensibly religious test for defining a Jew, 
although it does not require immigration applicants to be religious Jews 
according to the current definition of the concept.260 However, the law explicitly 
denies the Right of Return from those who are formally defined as Jews but 
belong to a different religion.261 Underlying this assertion is a position, probably 
accepted by an overwhelming majority of the Jewish people—members of 
various religious denominations as well as secular Jews—that joining another 
religion revokes the Jewish national identity.262 
If the Law of Return expressly excludes a member of a different religion 
from the definition of a Jew for the purpose of determining eligibility to the 
Right of Return, how is it possible that the same law grants a right to immigrate 
to Israel to active members of other religions? The answer lies in Article 4A of 
the Law of Return—the Amendment expanding the eligibility for spouses of 
Jews and their descendants and their descendants’ spouses to a third 
generation.263 All of these people are entitled to return, even if the Jew by whose 
right they obtained the right to immigrate to Israel does not join them.264 Among 
immigrants who came under this section, there are quite a few people who are 
not only not considered Jewish under the Law of Return but also actively belong 
to another religion.265 
The expansion of the circle of people eligible to return through the 1970 
Amendment was carried out as a complementary step to the restrictions of the 
definition of a Jew in the same amendment.266 Supporters of the expansion 
presented a number of justifications for the move. According to one explanation, 
without this expansion of eligibility, many Jews would in effect be prevented 
from exercising their right to immigrate to Israel since they would have to leave 
some of their non-Jewish family behind.267 This argument assumes that, in the 
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balancing test of social benefits, it is better to be over-inclusive. As stated by 
another explanation, many people are considered Jewish in their own countries, 
even though religiously they are not, and their self-identification as Jews resulted 
in discrimination and persecution.268 If Israel refuses to open its gates to them, 
they will be punished again.269 In this context, there were those who pointed to 
the Nazi racial laws as a perverse and reverse inspiration.270 If the Nazis defined 
a person as a Jew, despite the fact that his blood was “mixed blood,” then Israel 
has the moral obligation to recognize such a person as a member of the Jewish 
nation and allow him to immigrate to Israel.271 
These considerations are serious and cannot be written off with the stroke of 
a pen. However, it seems that, in the overall balance, a certain limitation on the 
automatic right to immigration granted in Section 4A should be considered by 
adding a restriction similar to that provided in the section defining a Jewish 
person in the Law of Return.272 Just as a Jew by origin loses the automatic right 
to immigrate to Israel if he is an active member of another religion, it is perhaps 
appropriate to deny this right to Jewish descendants and their spouses to the third 
generation if they are active members of another religion. This restriction is not 
exclusively based on religious grounds, but uses religious affiliation as a 
relatively reliable predictor (one that can be easily corrected, if the individual in 
question wishes to convert) for the chance of integration of the immigration 
applicant into the Israeli-Jewish culture.273 The State of Israel has an interest in 
strengthening its Jewish cultural identity.274 Absorbing immigrants who are 
active members of other religions not only fails to reinforce this interest, but it 
also weakens this interest since it is highly likely that these immigrants will 
constitute a foreign element in the Jewish-Israeli culture and may even help 
establish an additional religious-cultural minority in Israel on top of the 
indigenous minorities that are already living in the country.275 
To be clear, we do not propose the cancellation of Article 4A of the Law of 
Return. According to our proposal, many immigration applicants will continue 
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to receive an automatic right to immigration under their family attachment to 
Jews. The door will be closed only to immigration applicants actively belonging 
to another religion. The truth is that even this modest change is somewhat at 
odds with the justifications for the arrangement of Article 4A described in this 
section, which we do not believe have moral weight. Our proposal suggests that 
we reduce this tension in two ways. First, it will not apply to members of other 
religions if they immigrate to Israel together with the Jewish family member by 
whose virtue they are eligible to immigrate. This should prevent the breaking up 
of families and ensure that no one is left behind. Second, the limitation will not 
apply to individuals or even the family members of “Jews” who are persecuted 
because of their ties to the Jewish people. Therefore, we propose that members 
of a Jewish family should be entitled to return under Article 4A, even if they are 
active members of another religion, provided that they immigrate with their 
Jewish family member or they show that they are persecuted in their country of 
origin because of their affinity with the Jewish people. 
4. The Relevance of the Justification Based on Persecution 
On its face, the justification based on persecution depends on the existence 
of a present or future danger to the wellbeing of members of the national group, 
and it is not enough that such risk existed at some point in the past.276 
Accordingly, there are those who argue that, in the reality of the 21st century, 
this justification loses its validity in the Jewish-Israeli context since the Jews are 
not persecuted for being Jewish anymore.277 
Unfortunately, this claim is simply not true. Jews have been persecuted for 
thousands of years, with varying ferocity, but they have never been granted a 
refuge from anti-Semitism.278 The Holocaust marked an unprecedented low 
point in Jewish and world history, and given its magnitude, the question arises 
whether it can even be treated as just another point on the infinite continuum of 
persecution against the Jews. But, there is no doubt that before and after the 
Holocaust there were, and still are, periods and places where one’s Jewishness 
served and serves as sufficient reason to justify murder or other forms of 
persecution.279 
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One hope nurtured by generations of leaders of the Zionist movement was 
that the establishment of a Jewish State would lead to a normalization of the 
Jewish people and thereby to the eradication of anti-Semitism.280 Sadly, their 
hopes were dashed. Paradoxically, the establishment of the State of Israel not 
only failed to result in the abolition of anti-Semitism, but it also provided anti-
Semitism a new cover in the form of the “anti-Israel” movement.281 Indeed, as 
noted by a number of historians, anti-Semitism alters its shape over time and 
place.282 Sometimes it has a religious nature, sometimes racial, sometimes 
national, and, in recent decades, it has even found a new shape—the State of 
Israel and the Zionist movement, which, in one of the lowest points in its history, 
was defined by the United Nations as racist.283 
Even now, the unfortunate reality of the hatred and persecution of Jews has 
not disappeared from the world. Synagogues and Jewish community institutions 
in many parts of the world, including European countries, look more like 
fortified sites than houses of worship and civic institutions due to the amount of 
defense measures that the community leaders are forced to employ.284 Blatant 
anti-Semitism exists even in countries where there are hardly any more Jews to 
hate after all of the murders and expulsions.285 Anti-Semitism is present both on 
the surface and below, even in countries like the United States, where there is a 
large and prosperous Jewish community and robust, benevolent government 
protections.286 
Is there a basis for hope that anti-Semitism will fade away in the near future? 
Of course—the fight against hatred and prejudice is extremely important, and to 
muster the strength to battle it, one always needs to find hope. But, it is also 
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important to look at reality with open eyes and be wary of confusing hope with 
illusion. Recent nationalist and religious upheavals in the world apparently 
refute declarations about the end of history.287 Unfortunately, they also refute 
the assumption that Jewish persecution has reached the end of its long road.288 
This reality makes it unnecessary to examine the question of “what would 
happen if . . . ?” However, there is one normative point we want to stress—the 
justification on the basis of persecution actually serves two functions: it 
establishes the right of a persecuted people to a homeland generally and it 
establishes the right of individuals of that persecuted people to immigrate to their 
nation-state specifically.289 We agreed above that the validity of the justification 
on the basis of persecution depends on the current risk to the safety of the 
members of the national group. However, in our opinion, this point has to be 
qualified. The requirement of current risk is relevant only as a condition for 
establishing the right of the people to a nation-state (together with the 
justification of the right to culture).290 It is not required as a condition for 
establishing the right of individual members of a persecuted people to immigrate 
to their nation-state.291 An individual member of a persecuted people is entitled 
to immigrate to his nation-state under the justification of persecution, even if he 
is not persecuted because of his national identity.292 
The right to immigrate to a nation-state on the basis of persecution is not 
only meant to protect just the life and property of a member of the persecuted 
nationality but also his or her sense of security and well-being. When members 
of one group of a particular nation are persecuted because of their nationality, it 
has a severe psychological impact on all the other members of that nation, even 
those who have not experienced such persecution in their countries of 
residence.293 This is in part due to a sense of solidarity that characterizes 
members of national groups and also stems from the fact that people tend to 
project the lives of similar people onto their own lives. In the case of national 
persecution, the projection has a solid rational basis—if people attach negative 
attributes to a particular nationality as a basis for its persecution in one place, 
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there is reason for concern that the same reasons will one day be used for its 
persecution elsewhere. In a reality where anti-Semitism thrives in various 
locations around the world, it undermines the sense of security of all Jews, 
including those who have not personally experienced anti-Semitism.294 In this 
reality, any Jew who wishes to immigrate to Israel can honestly say that this is 
due to the desire to live in a place where he will never be persecuted due to his 
being Jewish. 
CONCLUSION 
The right to culture, which is well known and attested to in the context of 
international human rights instruments, establishes the right to self-
determination for the members of a national group to define itself as a nation-
state, and not only as a sub-national community. From the right to self-
determination within a nation-state derives the right, and even the obligation, of 
the nation-state to give preference to its nationals in its immigration policies. 
There are three driving forces behind this matter: the right of the nation’s 
diaspora to live in their nation-state; the interest of the national majority group 
to strengthen the nation-state’s culture; and the interests of this same group to 
ensure its demographic dominance—a reality whose existence is critical to 
maintaining the definition of the state as a nation-state. 
The right of the Jewish people to their homeland and the right of Jewish 
people to emigrate there is of course based on the right to self-determination. It 
is also based on the unique and special circumstances of this people in particular, 
a group that has suffered and still suffers from hatred and persecution and, 
therefore, needs its own state to ensure the safety and security of its members. 
The fact that the Jewish people’s right to self-determination is not acceptable to 
the countries that surround it, as well as to the Israeli-Palestinian minority, only 
strengthens Israel’s interest in favoring the members of the Jewish diaspora in 
its immigration policies to strengthen the national identity of the country and to 
ensure its existence by securely establishing the threshold demographic 
conditions that will continue to define it as a Jewish nation-state. 
The Law of Return grants immigration rights not only to Jews by birth but 
also to anyone else who chooses to join the Jewish people. This “joining” is not 
conditioned upon participation in religious ritual, ceremony, or behavior—a fact 
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which greatly weakens the criticism of the Law of Return that it is based on the 
assumption that the preferential treatment in the policy is based on problematic 
ethnic, racial, or religious criteria, which it is not. 
The Law of Return also grants a right of Israeli immigration to Jews and non-
Jews alike that have no connection to Jewish culture as long as they are officially 
or formally Jewish or have Jewish family ties. Since the 1990s, many of the 
immigrants to Israel, under the Law of Return, have not even had this kind of 
connection. Such immigration applicants cannot establish the basis of their 
desire to immigrate to Israel on the right to self-determination. 
Recently, a proposal was raised to cancel the automatic right of immigration 
for those people lacking any cultural affinity to the Jewish people, based on the 
claim that immigration like this does not strengthen the Jewish culture’s 
dominance; in fact, immigration may even weaken it.295 This proposal should be 
rejected because the reality shows that the vast and overwhelming majority of 
immigrants to Israel who belong to this group do, at the end of the day, join the 
Jewish majority, adopt Jewish culture, and assimilate into Jewish-Israeli 
society,296 even if they never end up formally joining the Jewish people. Under 
these circumstances, especially factoring in the demographic considerations 
mentioned above, the Jewish majority has an interest in preserving the existing 
arrangement and continuing to provide immigration rights to this group. 
Still, while most of the immigrants who do not have a cultural attachment to 
Judaism end up joining the Jewish majority and assimilating into its culture over 
time, immigrants who are active members in another religion usually do retain 
their own cultural identities and even form their own distinct communities and 
affiliation groups. For these immigrants, there is no acquired right to immigrate, 
and the State has no special interest in their absorption. Indeed, the Law of 
Return today already negates the right of return for immigrant applicants that are 
members of another faith, but only those immigrant applicants whose claim 
under the Law of Return is based on a formal affiliation with the Jewish people 
and not for those whose claim is based on familial kinship. In light of the above, 
however, it might be appropriate to expand the exemption and apply it to non-
Jews whose eligibility is dependent on a family connection, unless they are 
immigrating with a Jewish family member or are subject to persecution. 
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Another argument raised as a possible justification to cancel the automatic 
Right of Return granted to Jewish people is that, unlike in the past, Jewish people 
today are not persecuted because of their national affiliation and, therefore, the 
right to protection from persecution, which once served as the basis for the claim 
of the Jewish people to self-determination, is no longer relevant. This claim is 
factually incorrect in the sense that, to our great sorrow, Jewish people all across 
the world are still being persecuted for being Jewish. In these circumstances, the 
Jewish nation is still obligated to self-define in order to provide its members with 
a place to be protected from hatred and persecution. A similar proposal—one 
more limited in scope—seeks to base immigration on a claim of persecution, 
conditional on the ability of the applicant to show that he or she was in fact being 
persecuted because of his or her Jewish origin. This claim, too, must be rejected. 
The broad extent of the hatred directed against the Jewish people validates the 
tendency of the Jewish people to feel threatened and afraid, even if they have 
not personally experienced a manifestation of anti-Semitism. Under these 
circumstances, it can be assumed that any Jew that immigrates to Israel does so, 
among other reasons, to strengthen his or her sense of security and peace of 
mind. Therefore, so long as anti-Semitism is not completely eliminated and 
eradicated, every Jewish person retains the moral right to immigrate to Israel 
based also on the right to be protected from persecution. 
In the words of Prime Minister Netanyahu, Israel is still their home. And to 
return to our initial question—Is it ever morally or legally acceptable for a 
nation-state to favor one or another group in its immigration policies based on 
their nationality or religion?—we conclude that the answer is yes, given all of 
the above factors. We leave it to others to apply these rationales in other 
countries and to other laws, but we stand by the proposition that such criteria are 
not inherently immoral or illegal and are sometimes justified and correct. 
Certainly, from a religious perspective, these laws are not necessarily 
problematic, and while Pope Francis may be right that “one who thinks only of 
building walls and not bridges is not Christian,” it is also true that one who builds 
bridges with express lanes may very well be Jewish. 
 
